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ABSTRACT
OCCASIONALISM IN THE MALEBRANCHE-ARNAULD DEBATE
SEPTEMBER, 1992
ANDREW G. BLACK, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
Ph
. D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.
The philosophical and theological debate between
Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld is one of the most
important philosophical exchanges of the late seventeenth
century. One of the most siginificant products of this
debate is Mai ebranche ' s clarification of his theory of
causality, known as occasionalism. A theory of causality,
in this case, is a theory in answer to the question, what
is the extent of God's causal agency in the world and what
room does that leave for causality in created substances?
Occasionalism is a version of the view that God is the
only causal agent. Arnauld' s principal criticisms are
directed against the details of Malebranche ' s account
rather than the main thesis. Contemporaneously with this
debate, Arnauld was carrying on his celebrated
correpondence with Leibniz. Arnauld claims to Leibniz
that the latter's own theory of causality, the theory of
concomitance, is indistiguishable from occasionalism. By
examining the details of occasionalism, as they are
discussed in the Malebranche -Arnauld debate, it is may be
established to what extent Arnauld 's claim is true.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Prefatory Remarks
In May 1679, Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld,
who had been on terms of mutual admiration for many years,
were brought together by friends to discuss the issue of
grace and salvation. Arnauld, a leading spokesman for the
Jansenist movement, was concerned about the effect that
Malebranche was having on many Jansenist priests,
converting them to orthodoxy and, in some cases, rendering
them harsh critics of their own former colleagues. The
meeting was not a success. Malebranche was unable to
communicate with the overzeal ous Arnauld, and proposed
instead a written discussion. Mai ebranche ' s first
contribution to this correspondence was his Treatise on
Nature and Grace . The Treatise is a deep and systematic
account of God's working in the world, including answers
to the problems of the existence of evil, the possibility
of human freedom, and the seemingly arbitrary distribution
of the grace necessary for salvation. At the heart of
Mai ebranche ' s solutions to these problems is his theory
known as "occasionalism". What followed was a lengthy
exchange of books and published letters, little of it in
good humour (for reasons mostly unconnected with the
philosophical issues).
1
The exchange extended to cover a very wide range of
philosophical issues. However, I am interested only in
the issues connected with occasionalism. Occasionalism is
a general theory of causality, that is to say, a theory
about what entities exhibit the property of being a real
causal agent. My aim is to establish a working account of
Malebranche
' s version of occasionalism (Chapter III), to
show how he employed the theory in his answers to the
problems addressed in the Traite
,
and to investigate the
ensuing debate between Malebranche and Arnauld. This
latter part of the enterprise constitutes the central
chapter of the dissertation (Chapter IV)
. Arnauld was a
critic celebrated for his incisiveness. The criticisms
found in his many works opposing Malebranche invariably
cut straight to the root of the latter's theory.
Malebranche, on the other hand, was a slow but methodical
philosopher who did his best work under the constant
probing of his critics. On many points, it seems,
Malebranche ' s most considered view comes out in response
to some objection of Arnauld' s.
Malebranche and Arnauld constitute two corners of a
fascinating philosphical triangle of which the third
corner is Leibniz. Arnauld was convinced that Leibniz'
own theory of causality, the "hypothesis of the
concomitance and harmony among creatures" (which we now
know as "the pre-established harmony") reduced to
2
occasional ism, something Leibniz vehemently denied. This
denial, coupled with Mai ebranche
' s claims that Arnauld
misunderstood occasionalism, presents an interesting
question: what is the real relationship between
occasionalism and the theory of pre-established harmony?
If it can be established in what way, if at all, Arnauld
was in the wrong about occasionalism, it should be
possible to interpret the relevant correspondence with
Leibniz in that light. If, on the other hand, the
conclusion must be that Arnauld was right about
Mai ebranche, then perhaps he is right about the
relationship as well. This is the work of the last two
Chapters (V and VI).
For Arnauld, it is not most significantly in the nuts
and bolts of the theories that their similarity lies, but
rather in the consequences of each for philosophical
theology. I think it is fair to say that Arnauld felt
each view had, in particular, two unsavoury consequences:
(i) the view puts an end to freedom, both human and
divine, so that all the actions of both God and men are
determined; (ii) as an upshot of (i), it becomes a matter
of necessity, rather than a contingent fact, that the
world is the way it is.
The first two chapters of this work each play an
introductory role. In Chapter I, I examine the nature and
purpose of a general theory of causality in the
3
seventeenth century. It is my contention that the
theories of both Malebranche and Leibniz were motivated by
a desire to answer the question, what is the extent of
God's providential action in the world and what room does
that leave for causal efficacy in created beings? I also
give some of the historical and theological background to
the debate between Malebranche and Arnauld. in Chapter
II, I examine the Cartesian antecedents of Malebranche
'
s
occasionalism. Each of Malebranche and Arnauld regarded
himself as a good Cartesian. What is there in the
thinking of Descartes and his immediate followers to
support the position of either?
B. Occasionalism
Occasionalism is a theory of causality. In the
seventeenth century, this meant not an analysis of the
concept of cause, but rather an explanatory catalogue of
the kinds of entity that exhibit the property of
causality, indicating, if necessary, a heirarchical
ordering among such entities. It is important to note
also that, for Malebranche at least, occasionalism is a
very general theory of causality. Significantly it is not
just a theory about mind-body interaction, as has often
been suggested . 1
Mai ebranche ' s motivation for introducing a theory of
causality is not unusual in his milieu. Like all
theologically motivated philsophers he is confronted with
4
t.he following problem. What is the extent of God's
exercise of causality and what room does that leave for
the creaturely exercise of causality? if God’s causal
agency is ubiquitous, then what sense can be made of the
idea that humans are free agents?
We can identify a whole range of theories in answer
to this problem. At one end of the spectrum there is a
theory we might describe as naturalism (although it may as
well be called atheism). This is the view that there is
no exercise of divine causality and that all causal
relations are purely natural, i.e. they involve only the
exercise of creaturely causal powers. At the other end
there is the position that has been called voluntarism
.
2
This is the view that everything requiring a cause is the
effect only of God's exercise of his causal powers.
Voluntarism has also been used as a name for a
different though related theory, especially in relation to
the philosophy of Descartes. Descartes has been called a
radical voluntarist, and what this means is that he held
that God created not only all contingently exisiting
substances, but also everything else there is, including
eternal truths, such as the laws of logic, propositions of
mathematics and the simple natures of things. Here,
voluntarism is a theory about which entities require
divine creation rather than which events require divine
causes, but the relationship is evident. One could see how
5
radical voluntarism might be held as an extension of the
view described above as voluntarism. A radical
voluntarist would, then, simply differ from a more
conservative voluntarist in respect of the kinds of entity
regarded as requiring causation.
In between naturalism and voluntarism is a
considerable variety of possible views which have in
common the compatibility of divine and natural exercise of
causality. First of all, there is deism. This is the
view that God's causal role in the world extends as far as
the Creation. Thereafter, nature takes over and all the
subsequent effects are the consequences of creaturely
causal actions. A diluted version of deism would have it
that, after the Creation, God for the most part leaves the
world to run its own course, although he occasionally
intervenes (e.g. with deluges and plagues of locusts) when
he sees that the natural course of events is getting out
of hand. It seems to me that this would be a natural way
to read the early books of the Bible, particularly
"Genesis " .
Between deism and voluntarism lie the varieties of
theism. A main idea of theism is that God’s causal
involvement in the world is providential. Minimally, that
means that the theist is committed to God's causal agency
in everything requiring a cause. The varieties of theism
arise in the various views about the compatibility of
6
God's providence with natural causation. On some
versions, God contributes part of what is required for
each effect and natural causes provide the rest . 4 On
other versions, God produces perfection and natural causes
serve to limit that perfection
.
5 An alternative view is
that God is a complete cause of each effect in one way in
which it is possible to be a cause, but there is more than
one concept of cause, and hence creatures can be causes in
another sense.
^
Occasionalism is a kind of voluntarism. It begins
with the idea of Providence, the idea that God's causal
agency is ubiquitous. Central to Christian theology in
most forms is the idea that God, possessed of perfect
knowledge about the possible courses of creation, pre-
ordains the occurence of every event in accordance with
the design that he has for the world. We can identify,
therefore, three governing principles of God's
7providential action:
The Principle of Foreknowledge: God has perfect
knowledge of all the outcomes of every action he
performs in the created world.
The Principle of Pre-ordination: For every event e
that occurs in the created world, God has willed that e
occur
.
The Principle of Divine Purpose: Every event e that
occurs in the created world is pre-ordained by God
because God prefers a world containing e to any lacking
e
.
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Consider the Principle of Pre-ordination. It is possible
to identify a number of versions of this principle with
varying strengths. First of all, consider a weak version.
Let us say that God pre-conditions an event e if and only
if God efficaciously wills that some circumstances c
obtain and knows that if c obtain then e will be brought
about by some independent cause. To say that God
efficaciously wills x is to say that God wills x and God's
willing x is a direct causal factor in x's obtaining.
Here is an example of pre-conditioning. God wants a
certain soldier's ear to be struck off. He knows that if
the soldier challenges Peter then Peter will freely and
independently choose to strike off the soldier's ear. So
God efficaciously wills that the soldier challenge Peter,
hence the soldier does challenge Peter, and Peter strikes
off the soldier’s ear. This last event was pre-
conditioned by God, but directly caused by Peter.
So to our weak version of the Principle of Pre-
ordination :
Principle of Pre-ordination (weak): for every event e
that occurs in the created world, either God
efficaciously wills that e occur or God pre-conditions
e
.
Obviously we can construct a stronger version:
Principle of Pre-ordination (strong): for every event e
that occurs in the created world, God efficaciously
wills that e occur.
8
Even given the strong version, we can identify a liberal
interpretation and a conservative interpretation. We
have said that God efficaciously wills x if and only if
God is a direct causal agent in x's obtaining. Let us say
God concurs in x if and only if God efficaciously wills
that x, and there is some other agent a such that a is a
direct causal agent in x's obtaining. Let us say God
fully efficaciously wills that x if and only if God
efficaciously wills that x and it is not the case that God
concurs in x. Here, then is the distinction between
liberal and conservative versions of the strong principle:
Principle of Pre-ordination (strong-liberal): for every
event e that occurs in the created world, either God
fully efficaciously wills that e occur or God concurs in
e
.
Principle of Pre-ordination (strong-conservative ) : for
every event e that occurs in the created world, God
fully efficaciously wills that e occur.
A strong-conservative Principle of Pre-ordination is a
central element of any thorough-going occasionalism. Note
that I have formulated the principle in such a way as to
allow that God's providential actions are contemporaneous
with their effects. Pre-ordination need not, therefore,
imply prior ordination. So a view according to which the
finger of Providence is continually prodding the world
along is perfectly compatible with the Principle of Pre-
ordination in any strength. However, any philosopher
9
committed to the view that God acts from eternity must
concede that whatever God wills now he has always willed
and always will.
Occasionalism in Mai ebranche
' s hands has a positive
element concerning divine causation and a negative element
concerning natural causation. The positive element is a
straightforward version of the strong-conservative
Principle of Pre-ordination. The negative component is a
direct consequence of the positive component. No
creatures exhibit causality. Thus far the view described
is plain voluntarism. What gives occasionalism its
particularity is a third component — a kind of explanatory
component. The source of this component is Malebranche '
s
commitment to the Principle of Divine Purpose. What makes
God choose to create this world is that it is, according
to some measure, the best. By extension, what makes God
efficaciously will a given event e is that, given the
antecedent circumstances on the occasion of his willing,
he prefers that e occur rather than not.
Part of what enters into the concept of goodness
here, and what contributes to God's preference, is
simplicity of means for bringing about the relevant
effect. God chose this world because it could be
conducted according to the simplest laws compatible with
such a diversity of effects. God wills e because, on the
occasion that such and such circumstances hold, e is in
10
accordance with the chosen laws. This explains the
regularity in the world, and, thereby, the appearance of
causal interactions among created things.
C . The Malebranche-Arnauld Debate
Mai ebranche ' s occasionalism has been given a fair
amount of treatment in the secondary literature, although
it awaits a comprehensive and in depth study. The natural
place to look for clear statement of and thorough argument
for the position is in his expressly philosophical works,
most notably the Search After Truth and the Dialogues on
Metaphysics
. There is, however, another important source
of illumination of Malebranche ' s theory of causality and
that is in those largely theological writings in which
Malebranche is responding to critics. By far the most
considerable of such works are those that constitute
Malebranche ' s contribution to the extended polemical
dispute with Antoine Arnauld. This debate has been a
source of interest for those commentators concerned to
explicate Mai ebranche ' s position on the nature of ideas
(and also that of Arnauld, needless to say.) But the
debates over ideas were only a preamble to those over the
theological issues that each man found far more pressing.
There is hardly a single instance of English language
commentary that involves a serious study of the aspects of
the Malebranche-Arnauld debate concerned with the nature
of divine and natural causality. Yet when we read
11
Arnauld s most voluminous and central contribution to the
debate, the Reflexions on Mai ebranche
' s Traite de la
Nature et de la Grace
,
we see that these concerns are
uppermost in Arnauld' s mind.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will outline the
history of the debate, in the following three sections:
(D) a brief account of the theological doctrine of
Jansenism, maintained by Arnauld and vigourously opposed
by Malebranche; (E) the circumstances of the meeting of
May 1679, and of the subsequent dissipation of mutual high
regard between the two; (F) the course of the debate in
terms of published material.
D . Jansenism
Jansenism is the name currently applied to one of the
most important theological reform movements within the
seventeenth century French Catholic Church. 9 The name
derives from the movement's spiritual founder, Cornelius
Jansen, a Dutch Catholic, Bishop of Ypres and author of
the controversial book Augustinus (published in 1640),
which contains an exposition and defence of the views on
grace of Saint Augustine. The origins of Jansenism
predate the publication of Augustinus , however. It
started to emerge as a self-conscious movement with the
introduction in 1633 of Jansen's lifelong correspondent
and spiritual ally, Jean du Vergers de Hauranne, the Abbe
12
de St. Cyran, into the religious community at Port Royal
de Paris
,
whose Mother Superior was Angel ique Arnauld,
sister of Antoine Arnauld. Even before that, in the
latter part of the sixteenth century, the intellectual
foundation of the movement was being laid at Louvain in
the Netherlands where the University Chancellor, Michel
Baius, was disseminating the doctrines that would later be
codified in Augustinus . 10
Antoine Arnauld' s association with Jansenism was, at
least in part, a political one (although his intellectual
commitment to the doctrines of the movement is beyond
suspicion). The Arnauld family had a distinguished
history of resistence to the advance of the Jesuit
movement in France, Arnauld 's father having led the party
that succesfully kept the Jesuits from admission to the
University of Paris. The Arnauld family stood for the
defence of traditional Gallicanism in the French Church,
which brought them into conflict with the Jesuit
influenced monarchy, first through Louis XIII' s minister,
Cardinal Richelieu, a staunch supporter of the Jesuit
cause, then through the regent Anne of Austria and later
with Louis XIV himself, who found in the established
Church the major source of resistence to his absolutism.
The doctrines espoused by Jansen and St. Cyran had a
natural appeal to those defending the integrity of
traditional Church in its political as well as its sacred
13
role. The young Arnauld, already steeped in his family's
traditional religious conservatism, must have been an
eager disciple of the imposing and ascetic St. Cyran.
Augustinus was published in the Summer of 1640, some
months after the death of its author. The flyleaf to the
first edition contained an alleged record of Jansen's
deathbed words in which he supposedly submitted
unreservedly to the authority of Rome. Within a very
short time of publication, the book was under assault,
primarily from the Jesuit faction at the Sorbonne. If the
deathbed submission had been taken seriously, perhaps
there would have been no movement. But St. Cyran and the
Arnauld family, among others, clearly found the fury of
the assault on Augustinus too much to take phlegmatically.
When St. Cyran died in 1643, the leadership of the
movement fell naturally to Antoine Arnauld. He responded
to the duty by publishing a treatise On the Frequent
Communion
,
which served as a focal point for subsequent
attacks by Jansenism's opponents.
It is in the context of its opposition to the Jesuit
movement that Jansenism acquires its philosophical
interest. The Jesuits first appear in a major role on the
phil osophical stage in the protracted and bitter debates
de Auxi 1 i is
,
concerning the nature of grace, between the
followers of the Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina and the
Dominican Thomists led by Dominico Banes. It may be
14
worthwhile to review briefly some of the salient points of
that dispute. First, we need to introduce some
terminology with respect to grace.
After Augustine, it became a Christian commonplace
that the performance of acts meriting salvation
(henceforth 'meritorious acts') was in some way dependent
on the grace of God . 11 On even the most elementary
account, God's grace is divided into habitual and
actual. Habitual grace, bestowed at baptism, brings
about a more or less permanent condition of preparedness
to do meritorious acts, but the actual performance of any
particular meritorious act requires its own particular
bestowal of actual grace.
Actual grace is said to be sufficient when it
suffices to permit the individual on whom it is bestowed
to perform a particular meritorious act. On at least some
accounts (and this will be a source of contention) merely
sufficient grace can be resisted. That is to say,
although it suffices to permit the relevant individual to
perform the relevant meritorious act, the relevant
individual may freely ignore the permission and choose not
to perform the act. Sufficient grace is said to be
efficacious when its bestowal results in the actual
performance of the relevant meritorious act. On at least
some views (again a point of contention), there is a
certain kind of grace bestowed by God which cannot be
15
resisted, i.e. it always results in meritorious acts. Let
us call such irresistable grace intrinsically efficacious,
since its efficacy depends only on its bestowal and not
also on a subsequent free co-operation on the part of the
recipient
.
Given this distinction and with an eye to the issue
of whether or not grace (of either the sufficient or
efficacious kind) can be earned by meritorious actions, we
may distinguish four broad positions on the doctrine of
grace: (a) grace can be earned by merit and is always
merely sufficient; (b) grace can be earned by merit, but
once earned is always intrinsically efficacious; (c) grace
cannot be merited, but is merely sufficient; (d) grace
cannot be merited and is always intrinsically efficacious.
Doctrine (a) is what came to be regarded very early in the
history of the Church as the Pelagian heresy. To the best
of my knowledge, (b) is not a doctrine propounded by any
major theologian.
It is with respect to doctrines (c) and (d) that the
dispute between Jesuit Molinists and Dominican Thomists
arises. It had long been a theological concern that
adherence to (d) has the apparent consequence that free-
will must be denied, at least with respect to actions
meriting salvation. But this consequence is against the
declarations of the Council of Trent^, in particular the
fol lowing:
16
Anathema to those who would say that the free will of
man, moved and excited by God, does not co-operate at
all, for disposing and preparing him for the grace ofjustification, in accepting the excitation and call of
God, and that man cannot, even if he wills to, reject
them; but that, like an inanimate being, he does
absolutely nothing and remains entirely passive.
On the other hand, (c) suggested to most Christian
theologians from Augustine onward an unacceptable degree
of liberty on the part of men, i.e. a degree that
diminishes the extent of God’s Providence. Position (c),
not unnaturally, found itself dubbed
' semi-pe lagiani sm
'
because of its partial admission of Pelagian doctrine. 14
I think that it is safest to characterize the dispute
between Molinists and Thomists in this way: (c), along
with its associated theological difficulties, is the
position ascribed to Molinists by Thomists; (d) along with
its problems is the position attributed to Thomists by
Molinists. Each side, not surprisingly, resisted the
attribution made by the other. When it comes to
characterizing the respective positions in a way that
would have been acceptable to the holders, the ground gets
less firm. Here is an attempt.
1 . Molinism 15
Schematically speaking, the Molinist position is best
characterized by (c), but the details of the account are
intended to preclude the alleged difficulties of that
position, in particular the problem that (c) seems to
17
entail an unacceptable curtailing of God's Providence.
According to Molinism, man is always free to choose
whether or not to co-operate with a particular bestowal of
sufficient grace, and sufficient grace is only ever
rendered efficacious by the free co-operation of man.
However, God is able to foresee what any given individual,
i, would freely do when put in any particular situation,
s. He can foresee this not by knowledge of his own will,
since if what i would do in s is determined by God's will
then i is not really free. Neither can God foresee what i
would do in s by knowledge of his own intellect, since
such knowledge is only of necessary truths. So, according
to Molinism, God foresees the free acts of free agents by
a kind of middle knowledge, the notorious scientia media.
The objects of such knowledge are contingently true
conditionals of the form "if i were in situation s, i
would freely choose to do a", which conditionals are not
dependent on God's will.
How does this preserve providence? The short answer
is that Molinists adopt a weak version of the Principle of
Pre-ordination (see section B) . Some events in the world,
i.e. the free choices of free individuals, are merely pre-
conditioned. God knows, through his knowledge of his own
intellect, which individuals it is possible to create and
in what circumstances. Furthermore, his middle knowledge
tells him that some possible worlds would not be
18
actualized even were he to do everything in his power to
bring them about. They involve certain free choices on
the part of free individuals that could, but as a matter
of fact would not be made if the appropriate conditions
were set. So, by a combination of his knowledge of his
intellect and his middle knowledge, God knows which worlds
it is in his power to bring about. Hence, the world that
God creates and conserves is one such that he foresaw and
chose all the events that take place in it. Every state
of affairs in the actual world was pre-ordained by God,
even though many of them are the result of the free
choices of free agents who genuinely could have acted
differently
.
2
.
( Banesian) Thomism 16
For Banes and his associates, the heart of the
Molinist error is the appeal to scientia media. God,
being the primary cause of all things, is the direct and
immediate cause even of the free choices of free agents.
So his knowledge of contingent events which are the
natural consequences of such free choices is acquired
through what Banes calls "knowledge of causes". God knows
what free choices he himself has made, and hence knows
what free choices men will make in consequence of that.
So Banes and his followers are committed to a strong
version of the Principle of Pre-ordination, but in order
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to preserve human freedom it must be what I have dubbed a
'strong-liberal' version.
What account of freedom can be provided here?
Consider the following formula:
S is free with respect to action a if and only if, all
the requisites for doing a having been posited, Scan do
a and S can refrain from doing a.
This is a rather crude modernisation of a standard
scholastic formula for freedom. As Banes points out (with
respect to something like this), the strength of the
formula depends on the interpretation of 'requisites' in
"all requisites... having been posited". Banes claims
that (a version of) this formula is true if 'requisites’
means 'requisites prior to the moment of action'. Hence
if the combination of all the antecedent natural
conditions up to the moment before my performing action a
with the ordinary conservative concourse of God is
compatible both with my performing a and with my
refraining from performing a, then I am free with respect
to a. This is true even though my performing a under
these circumstances must be a direct and immediate effect
of God's simultaneous activity as primary cause.
Now we are in a position to see what Banes held with
respect to grace. Meritorious actions are free in the
sense described above, although they cannot be performed
without a simultaneous bestowal of grace on God's part.
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In a case in which the bestowal of grace turns out to be
efficacious, it is intrinsically efficacious. It does not
depend on a consequent free co-operation of the recipient,
because, given the conjunction of the antecedent
conditions with the bestowal, it is not possible that the
relevant act not be performed. In some cases the bestowal
of grace is merely sufficient. These are cases in which
God, knowing that the relevant individual will freely
choose not to perform the relevant meritorious act,
nonetheless bestows a grace that would directly result in
that act being performed were the agent to choose to
perform it.
3 . Jansenism
The two positions outlined above were the chief
candidates for a Catholic theology of grace. The debate
between the two camps ended up in the Papal court, at the
infamous Congregationes de Auxiliis (roughly the
Congresses on Aids [to Grace]). These began in 1598 and
ended inconclusively in December 1611 with a Papal edict
prohibiting further debates on issues of grace and
asserting that the institutions of the Council of Trent
1
7
gave satisfactory guidance.
Under these circumstances, and with the prohibition
confirmed and reconfirmed in 1625, 1641 and 1654, the
Jansenist doctrine on grace appeared as an unwelcome third
contender. Once again it is easier to put across what the
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position's opponents represented it as claiming than what
its adherents actually held.
The first reaction among the critics of Augustinus
was that it resurrected the doctrines of Michel Baius. 18
Baianism was represented in the condemnatory papal bull
"?" as being an unsavory mixture of Pelagianism
(concerning the natural state of man) and Calvinism or
even Socinianism (concerning man's condition after the
fall from grace
.
)
The opposition to the doctrines of Baius had never
been clearly formulated (there was even unclarity about
how many propositions were condemned by the original
bull), but in the case of Jansenism, the opposition was
more organized and came up with a list of five heretical
doctrines to be found in Augustinus . 19
The five propositions are as follows: 20
1. Some commandments of God are impossible for just men
willing and striving according to the natural powers
they have; they lack, in addition, that grace which
would make those things possible.
2. In the state of fallen nature, interior grace is never
resisted
.
3. In order for merit and demerit in the state of fallen
nature, liberty from necessity is not required, but
rather liberty from constraint suffices.
4. The semi-pelagians admitted the necessity of prevenient
interior grace for each particular action, even for the
beginning of faith; and in this they were heretics,
that they desired that this grace should be such that
the human will could either resist or obey it.
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5. It is semi-pelagian to say that Christ died or that he
shed his blood for all men in general.
The first, second and fourth propositions are unacceptable
for the same reason. According to orthodoxy, God bestows
grace sufficient for merit on all men, but only in some
cases is this grace efficacious, and it is never
intrinsically efficacious. So if a man, however
righteous, fails to obey the commandments, it is only
because he has freely chosen to fail notwithstanding the
bestowal of sufficient grace. More broadly, with respect
to the second proposition, every failure to perform a
possible meritorious action is an instance of resisting
interior grace. Clearly, the same remark holds with
respect to the fourth proposition.
The objection to the fifth proposition follows
directly from this. Christ's death is understood to be an
instrumental event in releasing the grace required for
salvation. If grace were only ever efficacious, i.e. were
never resisted, and only a minority merit salvation, then
grace could only have been bestowed on that minority;
Christ could only have died for those few. But since the
supposition that grace is only ever efficacious is false,
and since sufficient grace is bestowed on all men, it must
be that Christ died for everyone.
The third proposition is in a way the most
interesting. The objection is fairly obvious. Mere
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freedom from constraint without freedom from necessity is
no real freedom at all. What is interesting is that, as
with each of the other propositions, Arnauld argued
vigorously that this is not really part of Jansenist
doctrine at all.
So what is the doctrine that Arnauld held? First of
all, he held that there is a certain kind of grace that is
always present in meritorious actions. If that grace is
bestowed, then it is, as a matter of fact, never resisted.
It could be resisted, but it never is. Notice that this
compatible with the existence of another type of actual
grace, merely sufficient, which is present in all those
cases where someone fails to perform a meritorious action
that is open to them. The latter may be sufficient for
meritorious action even though it never is as a matter of
fact accompanied by such action; the former may not be
necessary for such action even though it and it alone is
always present in the case of such action.
Such an account would save Jansenism from commiting
the errors of propositions one, two, four and five. It is
not clear to me whether that is the account that Arnauld
offered, only that what he held was compatible with it.
It is the third proposition that Arnauld had most
difficulty dealing with, and indeed he ultimately seems to
have come to accept that Jansenism cannot avoid this
proposition. Arnauld argued that meritorious action
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requires freedom on the part of the agent, that freedom
involves the genuine power to choose to do otherwise, and
that agent performing a meritorious action has such power
even though the bestowal of efficacious grace directly
d©t.ermines the choice of the agent. it is important to
notice that this is not the same position as that
propounded by Banes. Banes said that an agent is
genuinely free so long as all the antecedent conditions
not including the actual bestowal of the grace are
compatible with the power to do otherwise. Arnauld wanted
to have it that an agent is only free if given all the
conditions (bestowal of grace included) he or she still
has the power to do otherwise. He seems to have wanted it
that actual grace determines the action of the meritorious
agent, that that action is free and that compatibi 1 i sm is
false. Ultimately, as I have pointed out, Arnauld came to
see that such an account was impossible. I suspect it is
this part of Jansenism that Malebranche had in mind when
o i
he described the position as a "galimatias".
E. The Circumstances of the Ma 1 ebranche-Arnau 1 d Debate
The characteristic of the Malebranche-Arnauld debate
that endures most firmly in the mind is the acrimony of
its conduct. It is little short of astonishing that two
figures of such considerable substance, from the same
religion, with such considerable common ground
philosophically, should have treated each other with such
25
evident lack of respect, and it is worth examining the
origins of the ill-feeling that seems to have pervaded the
debate
.
It must be said, at the outset, that I feel the
acrimony to have been exaggerated by many commentators.
It is to be noted that an abrasive stance is part of
Arnauld's stock in trade as a philosophical and
theological critic. For example, the start of his
correspondence with Leibniz is marked by the umbrage that
the latter takes over Arnauld's early comments. From
Arnauld's subsequent letters, it is clear that he is
surprised by Leibniz' reaction, and I am sympathetic to
his plea for tolerance: "nothing is further from my
character than the irritability that some people are
pleased to ascribe to me... I beg you, Monsieur, to
believe none of these things about me, but to believe that
the cause of my tactlessness is that I am used to writing
without formality ...." 22
At only one point, did the protagonists threaten to
reduce the debate from polemic to mud-slinging. This was
when Arnauld discovered among the works at press at the
publishing house of Elzevier, the nascent Treatise on
Nature and Grace, some months after Malebranche had
promised to send him a copy for his comments. Arnauld had
never received the promised copy, and was so incensed by
the discovery that he attempted to halt its publication.
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It is not clear from any of the subsequent interaction
whether either party fully grasped or accepted the role of
the other in what was really an unfortunate
misunderstanding, but nonetheless, the bitter
recriminations which followed from both sides receded over
time
.
But this is all to get ahead of the story. Whatever
the state of the relationship between Malebranche and
Arnauld after the publication of the Treatise
, it was
certainly not marked by professions of mutual admiration,
nor of friendship, and nor did it have the stamp of two
minds joined in the mutual pursuit of a common goal by
engaging in a respectful exchange of opinions. This is
noteworthy both on personal and on philosophical grounds.
On the latter, because, following the publication of the
Search After Truth in 1671, Arnauld announced himself a
fervent admirer. Father Andre, Malebranche ' s first
biographer tells us "M. Arnauld was one of the first who
gave vogue to the book The Search After Truth . I have no
doubt at all that this sprang from a sincere esteem for
that beautiful work." 23 By 1683, Arnauld' s treatise On
the True and False Ideas was devoted to an assault on the
central tenets of the Search . What could have caused this
about face?
Andre hints at, and Ginette Dreyfus in her commentary
on the Treatise supplies, a likely explanation. 24 Arnauld
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believed that he had found in the author of the Recherche
a philosopher and theologian of international standing who
would champion the Jansenist position on grace. In short,
Arnauld read the Search as a Jansenist treatise. When he
discovered that nothing was further from Malebranche
'
s
intentions, he saw instead an extremely pernicious
philosophy, dangerous both to Jansenism and to piety in
general
. Such was the spirit of the age that to be
marginally on the wrong side of the finest distinction was
to be hopelessly and dangerously mistaken.
In 1678, in a celebrated case, Malebranche persuaded
a young Jansenist priest, Michel de le Vassor, of the
confusion at the heart of the Jansenist doctrine on
25grace. Le Vassor became an ardent an active
"Malebranchist"
,
spreading widely a pamphlet containing
Malebranche ' s own views. This was, needless to say,
deeply troubling to Arnauld and Port-Royal. In May of the
next year, Father Quesnel, a mutual friend of Arnauld and
Malebranche, brought together these two, as well as le
Vassor, in an attempt to bring about an intellectual
reconciliation. According to Andre, Malebranche, who was
first to speak, was unable to get a hearing from the
voluble and overexcited Arnauld. 26 The outcome was that
the meeting broke up inconclusively, with Malebranche
promising to write for all those present a treatise
explaining his position on grace.
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The Treat i se on Nature and Grac
e
was written in
August 1679, and sent to the Marquis de Roucy to be handed
on to Arnauld at the end of the year. However, in June
1679, Arnauld, fearing persecution from the crown, left
France for the Netherlands, never to return. Evidently,
he never received his copy of the Treatise and, of course,
never replied. Malebranche, impatient of Arnauld’
s
silence, sent the manuscript to the publisher Elzevier in
Amsterdam in June 1680. Arnauld discovered the manuscript
there in the next month and, angered at the slight he
perceived, attempted (unsuccesful ly ) to get the
publication halted. "It is not" he wrote to Roucy "among
the rules of honesty to publish, after having asked for my
judgement, without having had it in the meantime." 27 It
is not clear to me that the misunderstanding was ever
cleared up, and although the subsequent debate was largely
doctrinal, it was never, after this incident, conducted
with good grace.
F. The Debate in Print28
In a letter accompanying Malebranche ' s substantial
"Response to Book I of the Reflexions...", the author
makes some recommendations about what should be read in
order to follow the course of the debate:
The first [item] consists in the first seven chapters of
the second part of the third book of the Search After
Truth, in which I treat of the nature of ideas. One
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must include also the Elucidation which is on the same
subject [Elucidation X]. The second is M. Arnauld'sbook On the True and False Ideas
. My Response to thatbook makes the third; and the De fens
e
of M. Arnauld,
against my response, the fourth. The fifth piece
consists in the three letters that I wrote on his
Defense
. And since M. Arnauld did not reply to those, I
put for the sixth piece of the process the Treatise on
Nature and Grace
,
in the Rotterdam edition of 1684, in
which is found the Elucidation concerning the miracles
of the ancient law, because it is the edition which M.
Arnauld has used... The seventh is the Dissertation of
M. Arnauld against the elucidation about which I havejust been talking. The eighth, my Response to this
Dissertation
. And finally the ninth is his first volume
of Philosophical and Theological Refelxions
.
part of my
reply to which I am now sending you. (OC VIII 623-4)
These instructions take us about half way through the
debate in terms of published material, although from the
publication of On the True and False Ideas in 1683 to the
publication of Book I of the Reflexions was a period of
less than two years.
Malebranche wrote this letter at an important
juncture in the debate. The subject matter of the
exchanges in this early period may be divided into three
groups. In the early going, Arnauld's principal target
was Mai ebranche 1 s theory of ideas, the notorious theory of
the vision in God, according to which the true location of
all our ideas is the mind of God. The view is presented
in detail in part two of book three of the Search , along
with arguments in rejection of all the known competitors.
Arnauld believed that the theory of the vision in God
motivated all of Mai ebranche ' s theology (a fact
Malebranche vehemently denied), hence his preliminary
30
response to the Search was directed against the parts of
that work relevant to this theory. On the True and False
Ideas is given over entirely to an attack on the vision in
God, and the subsequent works, the Response by the author
9l the Search After Truth , the Defense of WL Arnauld and
the Three Letters maintain the same controversy.
The discussion of the Treatise on Nature and Grace
represents a departure, as explained in the previous
section. The subject is changed from the theory of ideas
to the more theologically oriented issues of grace,
freedom and the nature of divine action. Arnauld had,
anyway, regarded the debate spawned by On the True and
False Ideas
,
as a prelude to debate on these weightier
matters
.
The Dissertation of M . Arnauld is his first venture
against the Treatise
,
and is directed, as noted in the
letter above, against the fourth elucidation of that work,
added in the edition of 1684. The Dissertation is not yet
a direct attack on the central doctrines of the Treatise
,
but nonetheless it singles out for attention an issue that
will be at the heart of the debate up to (and even beyond)
Arnauld 's death - the manner of God’s operation in the
world. The Dissertation and Malebranche ’ s response to it
are concerned with the manner of God's miraculous action,
but Malebranche claimed, in his response to the
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Dissertation
, that the fourth elucidation "established the
principles necessary for understanding [the Treatise ]." 29
This exchange is a final warm-up joust before the
main event. Arnauld's Philosophical and Theological
Reflexions on the New System of Nature and Grace,
P^-^lished in three substantial volumes, constitutes his
major effort against the philosophy of Malebranche. The
first volume appeared alone in 1685 and elicited a
response from the latter in the form of three published
letters in 1686. The passage quoted at the beginning of
this section is taken from a prefatory note appended to
the first of these letters. The second and third volumes
of the Reflexions followed later in 1686, and Malebranche
again responded in the form of published letters early in
the next year.
The first period of the debate was brought to a close
in 1687, by the publication of Mai ebranche ' s Four
1 etters . . . concerning those of M . Arnauld . The letters of
Arnauld in question are the nine collected in the winter
of 1685 under the title Letters of M . Arnauld
,
Doctor of
the Sorbonne
,
to Rev . Father Malebranche . They cover all
aspects of the debate.
In 1694, the year of Arnauld's death, the two briefly
exchanged opinions once again. The occasion for this
exchange was a debate in the Journa 1 des Scavans in March
of that year between Malebranche and Pierre-Sy 1 vain Regis
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on two issues: the perennial question of the nature of
ideas and an issue provoked by Mai ebranche
’ s view that the
pleasures of the senses are sufficient to render man
happy. In the Journal des Scavans for June 28th 1694,
Arnauld published the first of four letters against
Mai ebranche ' s opinions on these matters, opening with this
profession:
I thought I had laid these two points so well and truly
open, the first in the treatise On the True and False
Ideas
,
and in the Defense of that treatise; the second
in the first book of Reflexions on your new system of
nature and grace, and in the Dissertation on the
supposed goodness of pleasures of the senses
, that I
flattered myself that you found yourself reduced to
silence on these matters. (OC IX 1013)
The first two letters, along with Mai ebranche
' s replies,
were published in successive issues of the journal in June
and July 1694. The third and fourth letters were not
published until 1698, four years after Arnauld' s death,
but they elicited the rather bizarre spectacle of a
response to a dead author, written by Malebranche in March
1699, and published in 1704 as an appendix to the essay
Against the Prohibition
,
a defence of the Treatise against
the criticisms, primarily those of Arnauld, that had led
to its being placed on the index of proscribed works.
Against the Prohibition is the last chapter in the
Malebranche-Arnauld debate - a final and comprehensive
effort at vindication of the unorthodox views that
provoked the years of bitter and polemical dispute.
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Notes
1. Although occasionalism is commonly reported as a theory
specifically concerning mind-body interaction, Steven
M. Nad 1 er has argued very persuasively that the primary
motivation for seventeenth century occasional ists was
the formulation of a thoroughgoing account of causation
in the natural world. See "Occasionalism and the Mind-
Body Problem", Oxford Studies in the History of
Phi losophy 2 (1990).
2. This is the name used by Bas van Fraasen in Chapter 1
of his Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1989) page 350, n. 10.
3. Summarized by Jonathan Kvanvig and Hugh McCann in
"Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World"
where they describe deism as the view that "God is... a
sort of cosmic engineer Who, in the beginning, created
a world that operates according to certain immutable
laws, including laws of conservation. Once the
universe was in place it was no longer necessary for
God to be active in sustaining it, nor is it today. He
may, on some accounts, intervene periodically to cause
certain adjustments or changes within the universe or
its operations, but no continuous activity on God's
part is needed simply to keep it in existence" (p. 14).
4. Perhaps this is what Descartes has in mind in part two
of the Principles where he suggests that God causes the
continued existence of substances while the changes in
their modes are caused by natural means. See AT VIIIA
61-62; CSM I 240. Descartes' idea seems to be summed
up most succinctly in The World Chapter 7: "...it must
be said that God alone is the cause of all the motions
in the world in so far as they exist and in so far as
they are rectilinear; but it is the various
dispositions of matter which render them irregular and
curved. Likewise, the theologians teach us that God is
also the author of all our actions, in so far as they
have some goodness, but it is the various dispositions
of our wills that can render them evil" (AT XI 46-47;
CSM I 97). This will be taken up in detail in Chapter
II
.
5. See, for example, Leibniz in "Necessary and Contingent
Truths" at C 22 (translated in Leibniz : Philosophical
Writings M. Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson eds . (London:
Dent, 1973) page 102.)
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6. An example of such a view seems to be found in St.
Thomas Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles Book III, part i,
ar“ti c l e 70, wherein he distinguishes between God asprimary efficient cause and natural entities asinstrumental causes.
7. For a detailed account of the traditional doctrine of
Providence which makes use of the three principles I
describe here, see Thomas P. Flint "Two Accounts of
Providence" in Thomas V. Morris ed. Divine and Human
Action (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pages
147-181.
8. See, for example, Stephen M. Nadler Arnauld and the
Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1989), and Monte Cook "Malebranche
versus Arnauld" Journal of the History of Philosophy 24
(April 1991) pages 183-199.
9. The most complete account of Jansenism, both historical
and theoretical in its scope, is J. Carreyre ' s massive
essay in the Dictionnaire de Theologie Cathol ique
,
t.8
pages 318-530. Also useful is Nigel Abercrombie The
Origins of Jansenism (Oxford: Oxford University Press
,
1936)
.
10. For a complete account of Baianism, see the essay by
Xavier Bachelet in the Dictionnaire de Theologie
Cathol ique
,
t.2 pages 38-111.
11. Again, the most comprehensive yet unbiased general
account of the concept of grace in Christian theology
seems to be that in the Dictionnaire de Theologie
Cathol ique
,
J. van der Meersch, t.6 pages 1554-1687.
12. Van der Meersch, "Grace", page 1558.
13.
Declaration dated 13 January 1547, session VI. Cited
in E. Vansteenbergher
,
"Molinisme" in the Dictionnaire
t . 10 page 2095
.
4
See E. Amann, "Semi-Pelagiens" in the Dictionnaire t.14
page 1796. Amann speculates that the term 'semi-
pelagian' was first coined during the Congregationes de
Auxi 1 i is . It is most commonly applied to the doctrines
of Cassien and of the Massilians.
15.
Molina's views are expressed in his Liberi arbitr i i cum
gratia doni s , divina praescientia , providentia,
praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia .
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16 .
17 .
18 .
19.
20 .
21 .
22 .
23 .
24.
25 .
26.
27 .
The views herein attributed to Banes are expressed in
^
s 1 as^
i
ca commentar ia in pr imam partem Summae
Theologicae Sancti Thomae Aquinatis (Dubuque," IA: Brown
Reprints, no date) and in his Tractatus de vera et
legitima concordia 1 iberi arbitri i creati~cum
auxi 1 i is gratiae dei eff icaciter movent is humanam
voluntatem
.
See Vansteenbergher
,
"Molinisme" page 2166.
Jansen had been a student at Louvain in the latter days
of Baius' chancellorship and was an understudy, in the
Faculty of Theology, to Jacques Janson, one of the most
devoted of Baianists.
The Jesuits in the Sorbonne drew up a list of seven
doctrines, five of them found in Augustinus and two in
On the Frequent Communion
,
and invited the Doctors of
the Faculty to condemn them. A large majority of the
Faculty did so, although a sizeable minority challenged
the condemnation, and the competing factions sent rival
petitions to Rome. The Pope established a commission
to determine the state of the propositions and as a
result of the findings issued the bull Cum Occasione
declaring the five propositions heretical or otherwise
unacceptable
.
The propositions are here given in translation from the
versions presented in J. Carreyre
,
"Jansenisme" pages
374-396.
Reported by P. Andre La Vie du R^ P^ Mai ebranche
,
Pretre de 1 1 Oratoire (Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1970)
page 75. See OC VI 5.
LA 26.
Andre, La Vie, page 75.
Andre, La Vie
,
page 75. For Dreyfuss' account see OC V
xxi i .
Andre, La Vie
,
page 76; also OC V xxiv-xxv.
In the Defense of M. Arnauld , Arnauld gives quite a
different version of the event. OA t.38 427-8.
OC V xxvi i
.
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28. A comprehensive survey of the publications constituting
the debate is given by Ginette Dreyfuss in the
introduction to the 1958 Vrin edition of the Treatise,
which has the same title, editor, publisher and date of
publication as volume V of the Oeuvres Completes de
Mai ebranche
.
29 . OC VIII
.
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CHAPTER II
CAUSATION AMONG THE CARTESIANS
A. Introduction
Chapter III is intended to establish a working
account of Malebranche ' s version of occasionalism, as
presented in his major philosophical works, particularly
in the Search and Dialogues
. This will serve as the
basis for the examination, in Chapters IV and V, of the
debate with Arnauld on issues related to causality. In
this chapter, by way of a preliminary to the project
described above, I want to make some examination of the
Cartesian antecedents of Malebranche ' s occasional ist
theory
.
It is part of my thesis (a none too startling part)
that Malebranche is a very orthodox Cartesian . 1 I argue,
in Chapter III, that the argument for occasionalism as it
appears in the Dialogues is grounded on the most
fundamental Cartesian principles. Where Descartes is
sometimes inclined to avoid confronting certain perhaps
uncomfortable consequences of his views, Malebranche will
always accept the consequences unflinchingly. Many people
have seen occasionalism as an inevitable consequence of
the basic tenets of Cartesianism, in particular the
radical dualism, the ontological status of modes of
substances and the "constant creation" account of God's
sustaining activity in the world. ^ I will look at the way
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in which Descartes handles the problems arising from these
tenets. Descartes develops no complete, coherent
theory of causation, even though he is prepared to make
use of certain causal principles, most famously his strong
principle about the ontological relationship between
causes and effects in Meditation III . 3 Nonetheless, given
Mai ebranche ' s evident debt to him, it will be valuable to
extract some kind of causal theory from Descartes' views
and to note the points at which he is most evasive. These
are exactly the points at which the thorough-going
occasional ist will not flinch.
In the main section (Section B) of this chapter, I
shall consider Descartes relationship to occasionalism.
In the first part, I shall examine what he has to say on
the question of the degree of God's causal involvement in
the world. It turns out that Descartes is, at least by
his own profession, a committed theist. In the second
part, I will consider the problems that this poses for him
with respect to natural causation. In the third, I will -
evaluate two suggestions concerning Descartes' supposed
partial occasionalism: the first, that he is an
occasional ist about mind-body interaction; and the second,
a suggestion that has some currency, that Descartes is an
occasional ist about body-body interactions and about body
to mind interactions. I conclude that neither suggestion
is an accurate representation of Descartes' intentions,
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although there is a sense in which he may be described as
a thoroughgoing occasional ist malgre lui.
Some of the immediate followers of Descartes were
evidently driven towards an occasional ist position more
readily than he himself was prepared to be. In the last
section of this chapter, I shall look briefly at the
argument of Geraud de Cordemoy, in the Discernement du
Corps et de L ’ ame
,
intended to demonstrate the
impossibility of natural interactions involving bodies,
and concluding that the correlations between such natural
events must be the product of God's intervention. De La
Forge and Geulincx were similarly motivated, although, as
I contend, none of these arguments rests on the best of
premises. My opinion is that by far the best argument for
occasionalism appears in Dialogue VII of Mai ebranche '
s
Dialogues on Metaphysics . This will be presented in
Chapter III.
B . Descartes and Occasionalism
Was Descartes a pre-cursor of modern occasionalism?
A small industry has grown up around this question in
recent literature
,
4 and one of the interesting products of
what has been written is the development of the view that
Descartes was a partial occasional ist . He held, so the
view goes, that apparent causal relationships between some
natural entities are really causal while those between
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others are only occasional; for example that there is a
real causal relationship between volitions of created
minds and bodily events, but not vice-versa, or that there
are real causal relationships between mental states but
not between physical states.
I am not convinced that the evidence on Descartes
'
alleged occasionalism is at all conclusive or even
consistent. Descartes was never concerned with
establishing a fully-fledged causal theory. However, it
is worth examining this question given the commitments to
Cartesianism of both Malebranche and Arnauld. Since I
have claimed, in the Introduction, that causal theories
such as occasionalism are largely designed to answer the
question "what is the extent of God's causal activity and
what room does that leave for natural causes", I shall
approach Descartes’ view of causality by examining what
answer he would give to this question, employing the
distincitons established in Section B of Chapter I.
1 . Descartes on God ' s Providence
In a pivotal article in the second part of the
Principles of Phi losophy
,
Descartes, having considered the
nature of motion in general, as well as of motion as it
actually occurs in our world, makes the following move:
"After this consideration of the nature of motion, we must
look at its cause" ( Principles pt . I, art. 36). 5 What
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follows in this and the next article is, to my mind, the
most perplexing passage in the whole Cartesian corpus:
This is, in fact, twofold: first, there is the universal
and primary cause - the general cause of all the motions
in the world; and second, there is the particular cause
which produces in an individual piece of matter some
motion that it previously lacked. Now, as far as the
general cause is concerned, it seems clear to me that
this is no other than God himself. In the beginning he
created matter along with its motion and rest; and now,
merely by his regular concurrence, he preserves the same
amount of motion and rest as he put there in the
beginning... Thus, God imparted various motions to the
parts of matter when he first created them, and he now
preserves all this matter in the same way and by the
same process by which he originally created it...
[Art. 37] From God's immutability we can also know
certain rules or laws of nature, which are the secondary
and particular causes of the various motions we see in
particular bodies. (AT VIIIA 61; CSM I 240)
It must be admitted that I find the doctrine expressed in
this last sentence almost incomprehensible. In the second
part of this section, I will attempt to cast some light on
what Descartes held with respect to secondary causes. In
the meantime, let us pay attention to the doctrine of
divine causality advanced in article 36.
Descartes believed in a very simple ontology for the
natural world. There are substances and modes of
substances, the latter being simply ways in which the
substances exist. 6 One might add what Descartes calls
"simple natures" and also eternal truths, although the
exact status of these is unclear. 7 Given this scheme, we
can distinguish between the following kinds of states of
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affairs requiring causation. First of all, the existence
of any given substance requires a cause; second, the
having of a given property or mode by a given substance
requires a cause. With some minor reservations we might
accept this as a complete catalogue of the states of
3-f fairs requiring causes for Descartes. However, one such
reservation turns out to be significant. I will claim
that it is necessary to add to this list states of affairs
involving the changing of the modes of some substance or
the coming to have of some mode by some substance.
What is the extent of God's causal agency on
Descartes' view? Does God cause the existence of all
substances, or only of some? Does God cause every
instance of the having of a mode by a substance, or only
some, or none at all?
Let us take these last two questions in turn. The
answer to the first qestion is straightforward enough. It
is that God is indeed the cause of all substances. We
find Descartes giving outright affirmations of this, as in
the following, from part one of the Principles : "God
alone is the true cause of everything which is or can be"
(AT VI I I A 14; CSM I 201). He also argues for it, as when
he argues that each thing requires to be constantly
created in order to remain in existence. The complete
argument appears nowhere, so far as I can work out, but
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must be put together from fragments of arguments at
different points in Descartes' corpus. 8
In the Replies to the First Objections to the
Q
Meditations
,
Descartes argues for the conclusion that a
substance needs an efficient cause for each moment of its
existence. The argument starts with this premise: "the
concept of a cause is, strictly speaking, applicable only
for as long as the cause is producing its effect" (AT VII
108; CSM II 78)). Since he takes it to follow from this
that a cause is not temporally prior to its effect, he
clearly intends by this premise the following:
Premise 1: For every state of affairs s, if s requires a
cause, then s requires that there be a cause producing s
at the time at which s obtains. 10
The next premise of the argument is this: "I regard the
divisions of time as being separable from each other, so
that the fact that I now exist does not imply that I shall
continue to exist in a little while unless there is a
cause which, as it were, creates me afresh at each moment
of time" (AT VII 109; CSM II 78). The first thing to note
is that this claim about Descartes' existence can be
generalized to apply to any substance. Descartes is
engaged in a discussion of the question whether or not it
is possible for anything to be a cause of itself, and his
own self serves as an example. So, any state of affairs
of some substance's existing at a certain time t requires
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a cause. From the fact that that substance existed at
some prior time, it does not follow that the substance
will exist at t.
Premise 2: For every state of affairs s involving the
existence of some substance x at a time t, s requires a
cause
.
The following is Descartes' conclusion:
Conclusion : For every state of affairs s involving the
existence of some substance x at a time t, s requires
that there be a cause c such that c is producing s at t.
Descartes takes it to follow from this that there is no
important difference between the creation of a substance
(its being caused to exist at the first instant of its
existence) and the preservation of it (its being caused to
exist at each subsequent moment)
.
At this point in this set of replies, Descartes
abandons the argument. He has established to his
satisfaction what would be required in order for a
substance to be efficient cause of itself. It would have
to be something capable of preserving itself at each
moment of its existence. In order to see how he
establishes that no substance other than God is so
capable, we need to turn to the geometrical presentation
of the argument of the Meditations found in the Replies to
the Second Objections. 11
45
In the second axiom of the geometrical presentation
Descartes very briefly summarizes what has been achieved
in the above argument:
Axiom I
I
: There is no relation of dependence between the
present time and the immediately preceding time, and
hence no less a cause is required to create it in the
first place (AT VII 165; CSM II 116).
The argument also employs the following axioms:
Axiom VII : The will of a thinking thing is drawn
voluntarily and freely... but nevertheless inevitably,
towards a clearly known good. Hence, if it knows which
perfections it lacks, it will straightaway give itself
these perfections, if they are in its power.
Axiom VIII : Whatever can bring about a greater or more
difficult thing can also bring about a lesser thing.
Axiom IX: It is a greater thing to create or preserve a
substance than to create or preserve the attributes or
properties of a substance. (AT VII 166; CSM 117)
It follows immediately from axioms VIII and IX that
whatever can create or preserve a substance is also able
to create or preserve the attributes of a substance.
Since perfections are attributes, whatever can create or
preserve a substance can create or preserve perfections.
From axiom VII we know that any thinking substance which
can create or preserve the perfections in itself will do
so. No imperfect thinking substance has done so, hence no
imperfect thinking substance is capable of creating or
preserving the perfections in itself. If no imperfect
thinking substance is capable of creating or preserving
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the perfections in itself, then no imperfect thinking
substance is capable of creating or preserving itself.
Hence God must be the cause of the creation and
preservation of every imperfect thinking substance.
At this point, Descartes seems to believe that no
argument is required to show that the same holds for non-
thinking substances. The corollary of the foregoing
argument, he tells us, is that "God created the heavens
and the earth and everything in them" (AT VII 169; CSM II
119). In fact he does observe that a body cannot be the
creator or preserver of itself at AT VII 118 (CSM II 84).
This long and rather dense argument is very
significant in the current context, because Malebranche
found in the "constant creation" account of God's
activity, the basis for his rejection of all secondary
1 2
causes. In brief, his argument is that God must create
each temporal stage of a substance in some state or other,
i.e. with certain modes. This depends on the Cartesian
notion of a mode which is, roughly, that it is a way in
which a substance may exist. The distinction between
substances and modes is not a "real" one. ^ Therefore, if
God causes the existence of each substance at each moment
of its existence, he must also cause it to have the modes
it has. This argument will be presented in detail in
Chapter III. But what did Descartes think on this point?
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Does he believe that God is the cause of every instance of
the having of a mode by a substance?
There are apparently conflicting passages with
respect to this question. Chapter 7 of The World is
l aFCT e ly devoted to explaining the following observation!
"from the mere fact that [God] continues to preserve
[matter], it follows that there must be many changes in
its parts which cannot, it seems to me, properly be
attributed to the action of God" (AT XI 37; CSM I 92-3).
Evidently, there are some states of affairs that are not
caused by God. It is interesting to note that the states
of affairs Descartes attributes to natural causes are
instances not of a substance having some mode, but rather
of it changing its modes, and hence, that if we are to
accept this as representing Descartes' mature position on
divine causation, we must add such states of affairs to
our catalogue of what requires a cause. What is
attributable to God, according to Descartes' account in
The World
,
is the existence of each substance at each
moment and the conservation in it of its motive force,
which is equivalent to its tendency to maintain its
present state. Of course, this passage from The World is
concerned with physical substance. There is no reason,
however, to suppose that, at the time he was writing that
not all the phenomena of the physical world are properly
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a 't'tr'it)utabl e to God’s action, he would not have held the
same with respect to mental substances.
On the other hand, in what seems to me to be a very
important passage in the correspondence with Princess
Elizabeth, 14 Descartes writes:
I must say at once that all the reasons that prove that
God exists and is the first and unchangeable cause of
all effects that do not depend on human free will prove
similarly, I think, that He is also the cause of all
those that do so depend. For the only way to prove that
He exists, is to consider Him as a supremely perfect
being; and He would not be supremely perfect if anything
could happen without coming entirely from Him (AT IV
313-4; K 180)
.
The natural way to read this passage is as saying that God
is the (entire) cause of every state of affairs requiring
a cause. The kind of effect that "depend [s] on human free
will" is an action, which is a mode of a substance. So
this passage informs us that God is the cause not only of
the existence of substances, but of their having the modes
they do also. It is important to note the language used
here in the first sentence. God is "the first and
unchangeable cause" of everything requiring a cause. This
is surely meant to leave open the possibility that,
although God is the entire cause of everything, natural
substances may play a secondary causal role.
The conflicting passages suggest two different ways
of interpreting Descartes on the primary/secondary
distinction. On the view suggested in The World , God
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creates each thing that exists, sustains it in existence
and sustains in it the power necessary for it to engage in
causal interactions with other created substances.
Changes in the modes of substances are brought about
entirely by the interactions among them. On the view
suggested by the letter to Elizabeth, God creates each
thing that exists, sustains it in existence and causes it
to have all the modes it has. No state of affairs fails
to be caused entirely by God. There is a secondary sense
of cause according to which some created substances may be
thought of as causes. For example, some effects may be
said to "depend on" human free will. Which, if either, of
these is the right picture, depends on what Descartes
thought sbout secondary causes. This will be examined in
the next section.
2 . Descartes on Secondary Causes
We have sketched two possibilities regarding
Descartes' distinction between primary and secondary
causation. Each of these may be described as theist
according to the account given at the start of Chapter I.
In the first case, he regards God as contributing part of
what is required for each state of each substance - the
existence of the substance and its motive force - and
created substances as contributing the rest, causing the
substance to come to have the modes it has by interacting
with it according to the laws of nature. On the second
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account, God contributes everything to each state of each
substance in one sense of 'cause', and created substances
contribute in another sense of 'cause'. Each of these
views is compatible with the doctrine of Divine
Providence, in particular with some version of the
Principle of Pre-ordination. In the first case, the
relevant principle would be "weak" as explained in Chapter
I; in the second case it would be "strong-liberal". 15
Which of these accounts best represents Descartes'
mature thinking on the primary/secondary distinction? It
will be necessary to examine more closely what he has to
say about secondary causes in order to see what role they
play in his position. Ultimately, the two accounts can be
shown to be compatible, that each involves a concept of
Providence employing a weak Principle of Pre-ordination.
At article 37 of part II of the Principles
,
Descartes
tells us that the laws of nature are "the secondary and
particular causes of the various motions we see in bodies"
(AT VI I I A 62; CSM I 240). This is a strange and, in this
article, unexplained claim. For one thing, all of
Descartes contemporaries would surely have regarded causes
as agents of some kind, and hence, given Descartes
ontology, substances would surely have been the natural
candidates for causes. For another, it is hard to see how
a law can be, on its own, the cause of anything.
1
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^ is important to see that, for Descartes, a law of
nature is not a thing in the way that a substance or even
a mode is. Corresponding to each of the laws is some
volition of God, an eternal truth which is the content of
that volition and an attribute bestowed on substances as a
result of their being governed by this law. In The World
,
Descartes explains his thinking on this point more
clearly
:
I do not want to delay any longer telling you by what
means nature alone can untangle the confusion of the
chaos and what are the laws that God has imposed on
it... By nature here, I do not mean some goddess or
imaginary power. Rather, I am using this word to
signify matter in itself, in so far as I am considering
it taken together with all the qualities I have
attributed to it, and under the condition that God
continues to conserve it in the same way. (AT XI 36-37;
CSM I 92, my emphasis)
Descartes seems to hold the following about the causes of
particular states of affairs in the world. God creates
matter, whose essence is extension and its related
attributes of mobility, divisibility, flexibility,
impenetrability, etc., and conserves it "in the same way"
in which he created it. Since, at the creation, the parts
of matter were moving in violent disorder, conserving it
in the same way could not be equivalent to keeping it in
the same state. Rather, it amounts to maintaining the
same amount of motion and rest in it. Given that these
are the conditions under which matter exists, it is of the
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nature of the parts of matter to interact in certain ways
which explain the phenomena that we see. 17
The many changes in the constitution of the parts of
matter are "not properly attributed to God" but, in
Descartes words, "I therefore attribute them to nature",
which is nothing other than matter itself (AT XI 37; CSM I
93). It turns out that this amounts to agent causation.
In the Synopsis to the Meditations
,
Descartes tells us:
Body, taken in the general sense, is a substance, so
that it too never perishes. But the human body, in so
far as it differs from other bodies, is simply made up
of a certain configuration of limbs and other accidents
of this sort; whereas the human mind is not made up of
any accidents in this way, but is a pure substance. (AT
VII 14; CSM II 10)
This passage makes clear a doctrine that Descartes employs
without explaining throughout the rest of his
philosophical writing. There is an assymetry between
mental and material substance, in that individual minds
are "pure" or genuine substances, while individual bodies
are not. Only body "taken in general" ("matter" as
Descartes is calling it in The World ) is a genuine
material substance.
So when Descartes claims that "nature" is the cause
of the diversity of motions in the physical world,
explaining that by "nature" he means "matter itself", he
is attributing causal agency to a created substance. In
the case of mental secondary causes, it is clear that
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Descartes holds these to be mental substances, minds,
also.
It should be clear, then, that despite the unusual
language of article 37 of Part II of the Principles there
is nothing odd about the kinds of things Descartes regards
as secondary causes. They are substances. But how do
they act? What role do they play? Once again, in The
World
,
the idea seems to be that they cause changes of
modes, and that God does not cause such changes. The
reason for the latter claim is that God's action is
immutable. What God contributes to creation never
changes, yet what happens in creation is constantly
changing. Therefore something other than God must be
responsible for these changes.
How is such a view compatible with what Descartes
says in the correspondence with Elizabeth? There he says
"God is the universal cause of everything in such a way as
to be the total cause of everything; and so nothing can
happen without His will" (K 180). Surely this language is
strong enough so as not to preclude changes in the modes
of substances.
The account of secondary causes in The World seems to
be borne out by the following from Descartes' replies to
the objections of Gassendi to the Meditations :
An architect is the cause of a house and a father of his
child only in the sense of being the causes of their
coming into being ( causae secundum fieri); and hence,
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once the work is completed, it can remain in existence
quite apart from the ’cause' in this sense. But the sun
is the cause of the light which it emits, and God is the
cause of created things, not just in the sense that they
are the causes of the coming into being of these things,
but also in the sense that they are causes of their
being ( causae secundum esse). (AT VII 369; CSM II 254)
In the case of an architect, although God must be the
cause of the house's enduring, the architect is the cause
of the change in the arrangement of matter which
constitutes the house's coming into being.
This distinction need not, however, be seen as
incompatible with what Descartes has written to Elizabeth.
It is evident that Descartes is here distinguishing two
different kinds of cause, and that the primary kind
(
' causa secundum esse' ) may be sufficient to produce not
just existence but the changes in modes of substances. In
terms of the Principle of Pre-ordination, the causa
secundum esse may be a pre-conditioning cause with causae
secundum fieri being the direct and immediate causes of
change; or else, the former could be the direct and
immediate cause of every state of affairs in one sense
while the latter are causes of some in another.
As Elizabeth presses Descartes on this question in
the correspondence, 18 he reveals what appears to me to be
the crucial fact about his view of the primary/secondary
distinction.
Clearly the most difficult case for someone who holds
that God is the entire cause of every state of affairs
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requiring a cause is "that of free choices of human wills.
This is how Descartes handles that problem in the letter
to Elizabeth of January 1646:
Before [God] sent us into the world, he knew exactly
what all the inclinations of our will would be; it is He
who gave us them, it is He who has disposed all other
things outside us so that such and such objects would
present themselves to our senses at such and such times,
on the occasion of which He knew that our freewill would
determine us to such and such an action. (AT IV 353-4; K
189)
What is described here is surely pre-conditioning as
explained in Chapter I. We said that God pre-conditions
an event e if and only if God efficaciously wills that
some set of circumstances c obtains and c causes e to
occur. The way in which a free action of a human will is
dependent on God is just that. God knows how all wills
will respond to whatever circumstances they are placed in,
and creates the world along with its laws in such a way
that human wills will always be in the appropriate
situation to form volitions according to God’s design.
It is not hard to see how this explanation can be
extended to all secondary causes. Human volitions are the
hard case because it is not easy to see how pre-
conditioning leaves room for freedom. But in the case of
physical causation, the pre-conditioning account of God's
action fits very well with what has been said in The
World. God creates matter with certain attributes, endows
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a.t the first moment of creation with various motions
and sustains it according to certain laws. All of this
together is sufficient to bring it about that parts of
matter will interact in such a way that God's design for
the physical world is accomplished.
In the case both of free agents and that of the
physical world the direct and immediate cause of changes
in the modes of created substances is natural. However,
when we see that the actions of created substances have
each been pre-conditoned by God’s action in creating and
sustaining the world, we can see what sense there is in
saying that everything, including changes in modes of
substances, is ultimately attributable to divine agency.
God is the "entire" or "total", though not the immediate,
cause of everything that requires a cause.
3 . The Extent of Descartes 1 Occasionalism
One or another form of occasionalism has been taken
to follow from Descartes' views on causation in a number
of instances. Perhaps most notoriously, occasionalism is
taken to be an inevitable consequence of the radical
dualism between mind and body. Occasionalism has
traditionally been represented as a theory explaining
apparent mind-body interactions, although, as has been
1
9
pointed out, this is largely a misrepresentation.
However, Descartes was challenged by his most acute
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critics on the question how it is that two substances as
radically different as mind and body can interact.
The most famous instance of this challenge is found
in Descartes' correspondence with Elizabeth. In her
letter to Descartes dated 6/16 May 1643, she writes:
I ask you to tell me how the soul of man can determine
the corporeal spirits to make voluntary actions (being
only a thinking substance). Because it seems to me that
all determination of movement amounts to the propulsion
of that which is moved, by means of being pushed by that
which moves it. (AT III 661)
Arnauld, too, was puzzled by this. "It can scarcely be
understood" he writes in a letter directed toward
Descartes "how an incorporeal thing can move a corporeal
one" (OA XXXVIII 83). This puzzle seems to have led
Arnauld, at least, to occasionalism about interactions
20between minds and bodies.
It is clear that Descartes did not share this
reaction to the problem. In his reply to Elizabeth's
query he explains our inability to understand mind-body
2
1
interactions as follows:
The use of our senses has made the notions of extension,
shape and motion more familiar to us than the others;
and the main cause of our errors is that we commonly
want to use these notions to explain matters to which
they do not apply. (AT III 666; K 138)
Descartes has the following picture in mind. We
understand the world by means of certain elementary
notions - the notion of thought and its associated
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i the notion of extension and its associated
attributes and the notion of mind-body unity.
Corresponding to each of these, God has established laws
which govern the realm of substances to which the notions
apply. The laws of bodies in the case of extension, the
laws of minds in the case of thought and the laws of mind-
body unity in the case of that notion. We fail to
understand mind-body interaction because we conceive it in
terms of the notions that apply to extension alone. For
example, we wonder how a mind can "push on" the animal
spirits. For Descartes, this is the wrong way of
conceiving mind-body interaction.
It is important to note that Descartes sees no more
difficulty in explaining mind-body interaction than in any
kind of interaction. As we have seen, in the case of
both body and mind, the explanation depends upon
identifying the essence of the substance in question,
identifying the laws that it observes and seeing what will
follow given initial conditions. We do not explain, for
example, how one body moves another by appealing to what
power makes it push the other, but rather we appeal to the
conditions under which they interact and the laws
governing this interaction. Descartes can tell exactly
23
the same story with respect to mind-body interactions.
Another line of thought with respect to Descartes
possible commitment to a partial occasionalism has
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occurred more recently
.
24 The attribution is based on
Descartes' distinction between matter as essentially
passive and inert and thought as being essentially active.
Accordingly, it would seem, bodies, or body in general
cannot be causes of anything. There is no genuine causal
interaction between bodies nor do bodies cause changes in
the states of minds. Minds, on the other hand, being
essentially active can and do cause changes in their own
modes as well as in the modes of bodies.
It seems to me that there is an important insight
here, although to go so far as to attribute occasionalism
to Descartes with respect to bodily causation is surely
not justified. What it means for a body to be inert is
that it cannot be the initiator of its own movements.
When asked by a correspondent whether matter left to
itself without impulse from outside would be in motion or
at rest, Descartes replies "I consider [it] as plainly
being at rest ". 25 No body has the power of moving itself.
However, bodies in motion do have the power of changing
the condition of other bodies. A body in motion is
conserved in motion by the action of God, but, as
Descartes has told us in The Wor Id , changes in its motion
are attributable to matter itself and its attributes.
When we direct our attention to minds, we see that
what is different in this case is that they are capable of
initiating new thoughts so to speak spontaneously.
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Volitions are not law governed in the way that motions are
(even though God is able to foresee them and to predict
what volition would occur given certain circumstances.)
So minds are able to initiate change in a way that matter
is not. But that is not to say that matter is not a real
cause. Significantly, even in the case of the initiation
of a new thought in a mind, Descartes holds that such
causation is pre-conditioned by God, just as it is in the
case of matter's causing new motions in itself.
I think it is fairly clear that Descartes did not
think of himself as in any sense an occasional ist, partial
or thoroughgoing. The nearest he gets to affirming
something like occasionalism is in the letter to Elizabeth
of January 1646, where he says that God arranges
circumstances so that objects present themselves to our
senses "on which occasion he knew that our freewill would
determine us to such or such an action" (AT III 667; K
189, my emphasis). As explained in the previous section,
I believe that what is being affirmed here is that God
pre-conditions our actions without directly causing them.
This is not the view of a thoroughgoing occasional ist who
holds that, when objects are in the right relationship to
us, God causes us directly to experience them and to form
whatever volitions we do in consequence.
However, in Chapter III I will show that Malebranche
makes a very good case for the idea that God cannot be
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merely a pre-conditioning cause of natural phenomena. It
depends upon the idea that, if God has volitions
sufficient to bring about the entire world with all its
states, then that effect must come about directly and
without mediation as a result of God's volition. If
Mai ebranche
' s argument is succesful
,
and I am right that
he is arguing from purely Cartesian principles, then
Descartes must be an occasional i st in spite of himself.
C . Occasionalism Among the Cartesians
Among Descartes' immediate followers, occasionalism
was a very popular position. One can see, in the works of
such Cartesians as Gerauld de Cordemoy, Louis de La Forge
9 A
and Arnold Geulincx, much of the motivation that was to
lead Malebranche to elaborate his own causal position. In
this section, I will discuss briefly the arguments that
led each of these to occasionalism, and I will show that
none of these arguments is alone conclusive, although they
lay the foundation for the kind of strong argument for
occasionalism that Malebranche was to present in the
Dialogues .
In the fifth part of his main philosophical work, The
Distinction Between Body and Soul , 27 Cordemoy is concerned
with the same question as that posed by Descartes in
article 36 of part II of the Principles . What is the
cause of motion? Cordemoy notes, as an orthodox
62
Cartesian, that motion cannot be part of the essence of a
body. Obviously, any body could fail to be in motion, and
bodies are, by their nature, inert. So whatever causes
a body to move must be external to it. Cordemoy is
orthodox about the candidates also. They are substances —
other bodies, minds or God.
It is on the basis of another Cartesian principle
that bodies are excluded as possible candidates. This
principle is captured in the phrase cessante causa, cessat
effectum (the cause having finished, the effect must
finish too). As noted above (page 36), Descartes employs
ths principle when he says "strictly speaking, the concept
of a cause is applicable only so long as it is having its
effect" (AT VII 108; CSM II 78). Consider some body, b,
in motion. Whatever is the cause of the motion of b must
continue to cause b to move as long as b is in motion.
Therefore, the cause of motion in b cannot be some other
body imparting its motion to b on impact. So when one
billiard ball strikes another and the second rolls accross
the table, the first one cannot be called the cause of the
motion of the second, since immediately on impact the
first stops doing anything, yet the effect (the motion in
the second) continues.
Cordemoy takes it to follow from this that no body is
ever the cause of motion in another. His reason for
rejecting finite minds as possible causes of motion is the
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standard one
.
29 How could two substances as radically
unlike as mind and body interact. In order for mind-body
interaction there would have to be some common attribute
through which the interaction could work.
Since bodies cannot be causes of their own motion,
nor can other bodies be the cause, nor can finite minds,
the only remaining possibility is that God is the cause of
motion. Cordemoy holds that this means that all effects
in the physical world are caused by God, since all variety
in the physical world is explained in terms of different
motions of the parts of extension. God must also be the
cause of sensations in finite minds, since these are
evidently not caused by the minds themselves, nor by
30bodies, which, being inert, have no causal powers.
Significantly, Cordemoy does not exclude the possibility
that finite minds can be causes of some of their own
states. Malebranche stretches his occasionalism even that
far
.
Although Cordemoy 's argument seems fundamentally
Cartesian, I think there is no doubt that Descartes would
find much in it to which to object. The primary fault
seems to lie in the application of the principle cessante
causa, cessat effectum. Descartes, as has been pointed
out, undoubtedly believes in this principle, but, as has
also been pointed out, believes that among the states of
affairs requiring causes are changes of state. So, on
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Descartes' view, a substance's coming to have a certain
motion is something that requires a cause.
Suppose some body b is at rest at time t and begins
to move at t
x
. Descartes says that the cause of its
beginning to move at t
x
is "nature itself" by which he
means bodily substance in general, perhaps acting through
the impact of some other part of extension. As soon as
that impact has stopped it seems right to say that the
cause has ceased. Body b continues in motion, but that is
not strictly speaking the effect of the impact. That
effect is the coming- to be of the motion. That, of
course, stopped along with the impact. So, for Descartes,
there is no problem with saying that bodies play some real
causal role in the production of motion. No body is the
cause of b's being in motion, but matter in general is the
cause of its coming to be in motion.
There is surely also something suspicious about
Cordemoy's rejection of finite minds as causes of motion.
Surely God, as a spirit, does not share attributes with
extended substances. It seems that Cordemoy is under no
less of a burden to explain how it is possible that God
acts on bodies than Descartes is to explain how it is
possible for minds. Of course, there is an answer with
respect to God. In God, willing and acting are supposedly
the same thing, and it requires no more for God to produce
an effect than that he wills it. But if we are to accept
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this as an explanation of God's ability to produce effects
in bodies, then it requires some argumentation to show
that in the case of minds common attributes are required.
From Cordemoy we get none
.
When we turn to Louis de La Forge, what we find that
is missing in Cordemoy is an argument that is intended to
block Descartes' move based on the distinction between the
cause of some state of affairs' existing and the cause of
its coming to be. In the Treatise on the Soul of Man he
argues that no created substance can change the state of
any body. He writes:
It is not only necessary that [God] continues to produce
[the body] if he wishes it to continue in existence, but
also, since he cannot produce it in every place nor in
no place at all, he must put it in place B, if that is
where he wants it. (La Forge 240)
The argument is relatively straightforward. With respect
to every mode that any body has, God must cause it to have
that mode. If God causes a substance to exist at a
certain time, he must cause it to exist in the location it
is in at that time. If, at the next moment, it has a new
location, he causes it to exist in the new location. The
same could be said for the size, shape, etc. that the
substance has. If God causes each substance’s existence
and causes it to have all the modes it has, what room is
left for finite causes? What sense could be made of the
idea that a finite substance might cause another to change
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its state when what causes the new state is God? Surely
if God causes s to be in state a at t^ and to be in state
b at the next instant t2» God has caused the change.
There is no additional state of affairs requiring to be
caused
.
It seems to me that there is much to be said for this
argument, and it is at the heart of Mai ebranche
’ s Dialogue
VII argument. In fact, this seems to be the main ground
for rejecting Descartes' account of the primary/secondary
distinction. There seems to be no state of affairs that
God merely pre-conditions, leaving room for some other
substance to be the direct and immediate cause. However,
as has already been pointed out, there is an alternative
Cartesian account of the primary/secondary distinction,
one that it seems to me Descartes does not adopt but could
have adopted. This is a distinction based on a "strong-
liberal" interpretation of providence, in which God is the
direct and immediate cause of everything requiring a
cause, but there is a sense of cause in which created
substances can be real causes of changes of states. An
occasional ist must argue not only for the claim about God,
but against the claim about created substances. It must
be shown that the "strong-liberal" account of providence
is untenable. La Forge does not take this latter step.
Malebranche, it seems to me, does. This is the subject
matter of Chapter III . 31
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in "Occasionalism and the Mind-Body Problem".
2. For examples of such views see Section B, part 3 of
this chapter.
3. The general causal principle that Descartes employs is
"there must be at least as much reality in the
efficient and total cause as in the effect of that
cause" The strong form is this: "In order for a given
idea to contain such and such objective reality, it
must surely derive it form some cause which has at
least as much formal reality as there is objective
reality in the idea" (AT VII 40-1; CSM II 28).
4. See, for example, Daniel Garber, "Descartes and
Occasionalism", T. M. Lennon "Occasionalism and the
Cartesian Metaphysic of Motion", Steven M. Nadler
"Dualism and Occasionalism: Arnauld and the Development
of Cartesian Metaphysics".
5. AT VIIIA 61; CSM I 240.
6. For Descartes account of the substance/mode ontology
see, for example, AT VII 161 (CSM II 114), AT VIIIB
347-352 (CSM I 297-300) and in the Principles of
Philosophy part I
,
articles 51-65 (AT VIIIA 24-32; CSM
I 210-216)
.
7. On eternal truths, see Principles part I, articles 48-
50 (AT VIIIA 22-24; CSM I 208-9).
8. In addition to the locations cited below, a version of
the argument also appears in abbreviated form in the
Third Meditation.
9. The objections are from the Dutch Catholic theologian
Johannes Caterus . AT VII 91-121; CSM II 66-86.
10. In his Replies to the Fifth set of Objections,
Descartes grants that there is a notion of cause which
does not require this principle. See AT VII 369; CSM
II 254.
11. Those collected by Marin Mersenne. AT VII 122-170; CSM
II 87-120.
12. See Dial ogues VII (OC XII; D 144-169).
68
13. On real, modal and conceptual distinctions see
Principles part I, articles 60-1 (AT VIIIA 28-30; CSM I
215-6)
.
14. Elizabeth was the daughter of Ferdinand, the Elector
Palatine and deposed King of Bohemia. Elizabeth and
Descartes corresponded frequently from 1643 until 1649.
The passage quoted is from Descartes' letter to
Elizabeth of January 1646.
15. For these principles, see Chapter 1, pages 8 and 9.
16. If one conceives of a law as having a conditional
structure it would seem that in itself it can have no
effect
.
17. AT XI 37; CSM I 93.
18. Letter from Elizabeth to Descartes of November 30th
1645 (AT IV 336)
.
19. On this matter, see, for example, Charles McCracken
Mal ebranche and Modern British Phi losophy (Chapter3),
T. M. Lennon, "Occasionalism and the Cartesian
Metaphysic of Motion", Steven M. Nadler "Occasionalism
and the Mind-Body Problem".
20. For discussions of Arnauld's mind-body occasionalism,
see R. C. Sleigh Jr. Leibniz and Arnauld
:
a Commentary
on their Correspondence (Chapter 3) and Steven M.
Nadler "Dualism and Occasionalism: Arnauld and the
Development of Cartesian Metaphysics".
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supposed, a substance dualist, but rather a "trial ist ,
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substance - mental, material and psycho-physical, the
union of mind and body. This view of Descartes has
been defended by John Cottingham in Descartes .
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25. The correspondent is Henry More. This is from
Descartes' letter to More of August 1649 (AT V 404- K
258) .
26. On Geulincx, see footnote 31.
27. This account of Cordemoy ’ s argument is based on
material from pages 92-99 of Gerauld de Cordemoy:
Oeuvres Phi 1 osophiques
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P. Clair and F. Girbal, eds
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(Paris: Presses Univers itaires de France, 1968).
28. Descartes recognizes the relationship between these two
facts when he tells Henry More that bodies not
sustained in motion by God would be at rest. See note
25 .
29. Cordemoy, Oeuvres page 99.
30. I take this to be the conclusion of the first part of
his argument.
31. Geulincx' main argument for occasionalism is based on
the following premise: "It is impossible that one would
do what one knows not how to do". Since no created
substance knows how to move a body, no created
substance does so. In the case of minds, they do not
cause the actions of their bodies since they do not
know how to make the animal spirits move through the
nerves, and so on, in order to make the muscles
perform. See Arno ldi Geul incx Opera Omnia J. P. Land,
ed. (The Hague: 1892), volume II, page 150.
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CHAPTER III
OCCASIONALISM IN THE SEARCH AND DIALOGUES
Although the doctrine of occasionalism is evidently
and self-consciously adopted in the Search
,
and much of
the motivation for such a position explained there, a
thoroughgoing exposition of and argument for the theory is
not developed until later. In Elucidation XV, 1 in typical
Malebranchian style, what the philosopher regards as the
principal competitors are systematically rejected; in the
Treatise
,
clearly, a lot of the detail regarding God's
role is worked out and in the shorter Meditations
2Chretiennes of 1677 Malebranche begins to elaborate the
argument that is given its final form in Dialogue Seven.
It seems evident to me, however, that it was not until the
searching examination of the details of the his view that
Arnauld provided in the Ref 1 exions , that Malebranche
applied himself to providing a sound and coherent
philosophical justification for occasionalism. The fruit
of this application, as with so much of Malebranche '
s
mature thought, is to be found in the Dialogues .
In the first part of this chapter, I will examine the
account of occasionalism given in the Search , looking
first at the motivations Malebranche gives for the theory
and then at the collection of arguments he presents in
Book VI, Part ii, Chapter 3. In the second part of this
chapter, I will examine what I take to be Malebranche ’
s
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most serious argument for occasionalism, that which he
sustains throughout Dialogue VII of the Dialogues on
Metaphysics
.
A. Occasionalism in the Search
1 . The Motivation for Occasionalism
There is no doubt that, as an account of the
metaphysics of causal relations, occasionalism is a highly
unintuitive position to twentieth century philosophers.
One of the most valuable features of the account of causes
given in the Search at Book VI, Part ii is its
illumination of the motivation behind the view. On the
one hand, Malebranche believes that all the serious
alternatives, but particularly positions that might be
described broadly as Aristotelian, lack any kind of
explanatory power. On the other, attributing causal
powers to natural entities is heretical.
Chapter Three of Part Two of Book Six of the Search
bears the title "The most dangerous error in the
philosophy of the ancients." This error is the
explanation of natural effects by appeal to substantial
forms, real qualities or natures in natural objects.
Malebranche points out the danger: "if we assume, in
accordance with their opinion, that bodies have certain
entities distinct from matter in them, then, having no
distinct idea of these entities, we may easily imagine
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that they are the true or major causes of the effects we
see" (OC II 311; LO 446). 3
Malebranche points out that postulation of such
entities primarily serves to explain these effects, having
in mind a widespread view of the nature of science as the
search for causes as explanations. The rejection of this
view is an important part of the burden of the previous
chapter of Book VI, which is devoted to an examination of
the ways in which the established philosophical schools
reason by confused and indistinct ideas. What such
reasoning amounts to is employing terms which have either
only a vague or equivocal meaning or no meaning at all.
One significant way in which this happens is in the
employment of the language of sensation. Malebranche
claims that our sensory terms are, as he puts it,
"equivocal" between referring to our sensations themselves
and referring to the qualities in objects that produce
these sensations. Those philosophers who are not careful
to take notice of this equivocation, are apt to confuse
sensations with qualities that really exist in objects.
The other main employment of confused ideas occurs
when philosophers attempt to explain effects associated
with the actions of natural objects by appealing to powers
in those objects. We have no clear idea of such powers:
Fire heats, dries, hardens and softens because it has
the faculty to produce these effects. Senna purges
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because of its purgative quality; bread even nourishes,
if you will, through its nutritive quality: these
propositions are not subject to error... These or
similar ways of speaking are not false: it is just that
in effect they mean nothing. These vague and
indeterminate ideas do not involve one in error, but
they are completely useless for discovering truth. (OC
II 307: LO 444)
Our ideas of causal powers or faculties in natural
things are, Malebranche claims, a confusion of our
"general idea of cause" and the muddled ideas of effects
we experience (OC II 308; LO 445). Our general idea of
cause is simply the idea of that between which and its
consequent there is a necessary connection. 4 Our idea of
the causal power of God, for example, is just the idea of
the necessary connection between God’s volitions and the
obtaining of the states of affairs that he wills. We
experience no necessary connection between the activities
of created individuals, yet we experience certain effects
which we want to explain. So we posit non-sensible
properties in the natures of things - causal powers or
faculties - which would establish the requisite connection
even though we do not experience it. 5
It is not hard to see what Ma 1 ebranche ' s objection
is. If we seek to explain certain effects, we learn
nothing by being told that these effects are the results
of the action of beings that have the power to cause them.
If we had a clear idea of such a power we might be able to
see how it had its effect, but since we do not have a
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clear idea we can learn nothing from the positing of such
powers
.
Mai ebranche points out that you can give "a million"
explanations of this kind, but that will not provide the
kind of knowledge that is really required - that which
enables us to predict what will occur in as yet
unexperienced cases. He says "if you ask me to solve this
difficulty - namely, can fire harden mud and soften wax? -
the ideas of substantial forms and faculties for producing
heat, rarefaction and fluidity, and so on would be useless
to me" (OC II 308; LO 444). Our explanations of phenomena
that we experience must allow us to make judgements about
cases we do not experience. Suppose that all our
explanations were of this kind: phenomenon p occurs in x
because agent a acts on x and has the power to produce
phenomenon p in x. Lacking a clear idea of how this power
produces its effect, we would never be able to predict
what would happen in the case when a acts on some other
individual y, where a's acting on y has not previously
been experienced.
But the postulation of causal powers or faculties in
natural objects is not just unexplanatory . Malebranche
describes it as a dangerous error:
If we consider attentively our idea of a cause or of a
power to act, we cannot doubt that this idea represents
something divine.... We therefore admit something divine
in all the bodies around us when we posit forms,
faculties, qualities, virtues, or real beings capable of
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producing certain effects through the force of their
nature. (OC II 311; LO 446)
Malebranche thinks that allowing causal powers in natural
objects is tantamount to paganism. We are no better when
we do this than those who adored the sun because of its
apparently universal power to sustain life. It is true,
he admits, that we do not assign the same powers to, for
example, leeks and onions as we do to the sun. 6 But
nonetheless, in as much as we like them because they make
us happy, we are making little gods out of them. As soon
as we realize that there is no power in natural objects,
it becomes apparent that we owe all our adoration entirely
to God, which is, of course, in accordance with what the
faith dictates.
It is hard to know exactly what to make of this kind
of argument. It does seem to have a very important place
in Mai ebranche ' s thinking at the time of writing the
Search
,
although no such argument appears in the
Dial ogues . It is important to take note, it seems to me,
of the fact that this is not a direct argument for
occasionalism, but rather a motivational argument.
Occasionalism had better be true or else we are in trouble
with respect to our faith.
I think this point becomes evident when we see that
immediately following this argument Malebranche says the
foil owing
:
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In order that we shall no longer be able to doubt thefalseness of this detestable philosophy and shall
clearly recognize the soundness of the principles and
the clearness of the ideas being used, it is necessary
clearly to establish the truths that are opposed to the
errors of the ancient philosopher, and to prove in a few
words that there is only one true cause because there is
only one true God; that the nature or power of each
thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natural
causes are not true causes but only occasional causes,
and certain other truths that will follow from these/
(OC II 313; LO 448)
Clearly, Malebranche recognizes, then, that the argument
based on the heresy of attributing real powers to natural
objects does not "establish the truth" of these
propositions. Malebranche, perhaps more than any other
major philosopher of this period, freely mixed philosophy
and philosophical theology with religious dogma. But he
knows the difference between an argument based entirely on
faith and one based on reason. An argument whose whole
basis is that some doctrine must be false because it is
heretical does not "establish the truth" in the same way
as does one based on sound rational principles.
So we need not concern ourselves unduly with this
argument, except to note that it does seem to be an
important consideration in seeing why a philosopher as
sophisticated as Malebranche would put forward a theory as
unintuitive as occasionalism. As it will turn out, the
argument that positing of natural causes is unexplanatory
plays a more important role in his thinking.
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2. Four Arguments for Occasionalism
Having motivated his view about causality,
Mai ebranche has told us what it is that needs to be
established: that God is the only true cause, that the
power in natural things is nothing other than the will of
God, and that natural agents are only the occasional
causes of God's actions.
The arguments that follow in the Search are not the
most cohesive, appealing as they do to a variety of
unrelated principles. They owe much to the kinds of
arguments discussed in the last section of Chapter II.
(i) No motive force in bodies. The first argument
that Malebranche gives us has limited scope. It concerns
the causes of movements in bodies. "No body, large or
small," he tells us, "has the power to move itself."
Bodies are, by their nature, inert. "Since the idea that
we have of bodies makes it clear that they cannot move
themselves it is minds which move them" (OC II 313; LO
448) .
In order to show that it cannot be finite minds that
move bodies, Malebranche appeals at this stage to a
limited application of a principle that he is soon to
apply more broadly. It is this: "a true cause. . . is one
such that the mind perceives a necessary connection
between it and its effect" (OC II 316; LO 450). But since
there is no necessary connection between the volition of a
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finite mind and the movement of any body, no finite mind
can be the cause of such a movement.
It is not entirely clear what it is that Malebranche
takes this argument to establish. He tells us, having
pointed out that there is a necessary connection between
the will of God and the motions of bodies, that "the
motive force of bodies is therefore not in the bodies that
are moved, for this force is nothing other than the will
of God" (OC II 314; LO 448). But he adds to this the
conclusion that "a natural cause is not a real cause".
If, by the first part of this conclusion, he meant merely
to say that there is nothing in bodies beyond their
extension and its modes which gives them any causal
efficacy, that would seem at least validly concluded,
although surely question begging. The argument depended
on the premise that bodies are essentially inert, which
surely presupposes that there is no motive force in them.
But Descartes, anyway, seems to have believed that
there is causal efficacy in matter even though he held
that there is nothing in matter but extension. So
Descartes believed that even though there may be nothing
in a body beyond the constitution of its extended parts,
there is sense to be made of the idea that the body may
exert some force. That force is not an Aristotelian
tertium quid, but an attribute that allows causal efficacy
in matter nonetheless.
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Ma 1 ebranche ' s argument, deals with bodies as causes of
their own motion, and with minds as causes of the motion
of bodies. But it does not deal with other (already
moving) bodies as possible causes of motion. So that
although there may be no power of motion in a body itself,
nonetheless, it appears to require a further argument to
show that this entails that bodies could not be causes of
motion in others.
Presumably, the assumption at work in the step from
"no motive force" to "no causal efficacy" is that a true
cause of motion can only act by imparting its own motive
force to that on which it acts, and no body has such a
force. But the observation that "no body has the power to
move itself" can mean two things. It can mean that no
body has the power to initiate motion in itself, in which
case the possibility that a body already in motion has
some motive force is not excluded, or it can mean that no
body has the power to sustain itself in motion. In the
latter case, it remains to be established that a body
sustained in motion by some external force does not
thereby gain a motive force of its own which it may impart
to whatever it interacts with. This last seems to be
Descartes' view.
(ii) The 'Knowledge ' argument. This first argument
has, as was pointed out, a limited scope. Its conclusion
is that the movements of bodies (and hence, for a
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Cartesian, all the behaviour of bodies) have as their only
"true cause the will of God. Malebranche suggests another
argument with the same scope - the argument that was
attributed to Geulincx in Chapter II. it is that a true
cause must know how to produce its effect. In his
discussion of the implied divinity of natural beings with
causal powers, Malebranche entertains the idea that we may
avoid heresy by saying that although natural beings may
cause certain effects we can avoid treating them as little
gods on the grounds that they act without intelligence,
they "do not know what they are doing" (OC II 310; LO
446). But, he says, "who will believe that what produces
works that manifest a wisdom that surpasses all
philosophers produces them without intelligence?"
A little later, Malebranche argues similarly with
respect to mental causation of physical effects:
How could we move our arms? To move them it is
necessary to have animal spirits, to send them through
certain nerves toward certain muscles in order to
inflate and contract them... And we see that men who do
not know they have spirits, nerves and muscles move
their arms... Therefore men will to move their arms and
only God is able and knows how to move them. (OC II
317; LO 450)
The power to move a body depends on the knowledge of how
such movement can occur. Neither bodies nor finite minds
have such knowledge, and so they cannot have the power.
Rather as in the case of the argument from heresy, it
is hard to know what we should make of this argument. If
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knowledge of how to produce the effect is really part of
the concept of a true cause, then it is impossible to
avoid the strength of this argument. But, needless to
say, we, at least, do not think that it is part of the
concept. So perhaps this argument is best left aside.
There are certainly more interesting ones at hand.
(iii) The 'Necessary Connection ' argument. The
principle that there must be a necessary connection
between a true cause and its effect is at work when
Malebranche turns his attention to the causes of the modes
O
of minds. The argument based on this principle has a
more general conclusion. Since there is no necessary
connection between any states of created substances there
can be no natural causal connections of any kind. This
argument, too, is not of the greatest interest in itself,
although it plays a role in what turns out to be
Mai ebranche ' s most important argument. < It is based on the
Cartesian principle that God must continually recreate the
Q
world in order for it to stay in existence. There is
nothing about any created substance at a given time which
entails that that or any other substance will exist at the
next moment. So there can be no necessary connection
between the states of created substances.
(iv) No room for secondary causes. Mai ebranche '
s
last argument in the Search is a familiar one from La
Forge. It is also at the core of his Dialogue Seven
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argument.. The argument depends on a principle that
Malebranche frequently appealed to and that was not
challenged among his Rationalist contemporaries: in God,
willing and acting are the same thing. 10 As he puts it in
the Search "God needs no instruments in order to act: it
suffices that He wills in order that a thing be" (OC II
316; LO 450). Suppose that God wills a certain state of
affairs s, and that some other supposed cause, say the
volition of an angel, is also present (it could equally
well be the volition of a man or the movement of some
object)
. Malebranche asks us which of these two candidate
causes is truly efficacious. We know that the will of God
is necessarily efficacious, and that it has its effects
without media. So the will of God must be the cause of s,
and hence there is no room for the will of the angel to
have any causal role.
Clearly, this argument will only be valid if the
possibility of concurrence in the strict sense defined in
Chapter I is excluded. According to that notion, God
concurs in some state of affairs s if and only if he
efficaciously wills that s obtains and some other
individual is a real causal agent in s's obtaining.
Ma 1 ebranche ' s attitude to the possibility of concurrence
both in this strict sense and in the weaker sense in which
God concurs in some state of affairs if and only if he
contributes part of what is required for that state of
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affairs and creatures contribute the rest will be
discussed in the final part of this chapter and again in
Chapter VI
.
1
1
B. The Argument in Dialogue Seven
Commentators on Mai ebranche
' s theory of causality
have represented him as employing a battery of distinct
arguments in favour of his position. 12 This is certainly
the impression one receives from the account in the
Search .
I must say at the outset that I believe this rough
partitioning of the arguments, valuable though it is,
fails to give a completely satisfactory account of
Mai ebranche ' s best efforts on this matter. It is my
contention that Dialogue VII of the Dialogues on
Metaphysics consists in a single sustained and very
complex argument for each component of a most
sophisticated version of occasionalism. The last part of
this chapter will be devoted to a careful scrutiny of this
argument in its entirety.
Occasionalism, in Mai ebranche ' s hands, is a theory
with three components - a positive component concerning
divine or primary causal activity, a negative component
concerning natural or secondary causal activity, and an
explanatory component concerning the appearance of natural
causal activity. The Dialogues on Metaphysics is the best
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source for separate treatments of each component in the
context of a discussion of mind-body interaction. The
argument of Dialogue VII establishes first the positive
component and then the negative component. The central
details of the explanatory component emerge during the
course of this argument.
As has already been pointed out, occasionalism is a
general theory of causality, a theory meant to account for
the extent and nature of God's causal activity and of that
of all created entities. 15 Nevertheless, the argument for
occasionalism that appears in the Dialogues is introduced
into the context of the possibility of mind-body
interaction. Ariste, the interlocutor of the Dialogues
who represents a kind of naive Cartesian, 15 has started
out Dialogue VII by claiming that "there is nothing to
which I am more closely united than my own body" (OC XII
153; D 145). Ma 1 ebranche ' s mouthpiece, Theodore, responds
that the mind "can only be united to that on which it can
act" (OC XII 154; D 147). When Ariste is challenged as to
whether this is possible he is forced to admit "there is
something that I do not completely understand. How does
it all take place?" (OC XII 154; D 147). This sounds not
unlike" the worry of Princess Elizabeth and of Arnauld
concerning mind-body interaction on the Cartesian model:
how can two substances as unlike as mind and body
interact
.
16
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Mai ebranche does not seem to regard this problem as
in itself sufficient to show the truth of mind-body
occasionalism. The argument that follows is intended to
show that interaction between mind and body is impossible
because interactions between any created substances are
impossible - that is, because occasionalism as a general
theory of causality is true.
What I am calling the positive component of
Malebranche ' s occasionalism can be formulated thus:
A: For every created substance c, state s and time t, if
c is in s at t, then God is a real causal agent in
c's being in s at t.
On Mai ebranche ' s view, an entity can only count as a
real causal agent in some state of affairs if it
contributes to the bringing about of that state of affairs
by the exercise of some real causal power. As has been
pointed out above, his a idea of a genuine causal power is
one of a necessary connection.
Mai ebranche ' s argument for Thesis A is this. All
created substances are created by God. It is a
contradiction to say that a substance might be created
1
7
without being created in some determinate state. Let us
say that a state of a created substance c at a time t is
the set of all the modes had by c at t. We shall call the
state of a created substance c at a time at which it is
created by God a creation state of c. Whatever God brings
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about, he brings about only by his volitions. Since his
volitions are exercises of real causal power, God is a
real causal agent in every creation state of every
substance. Since God must create a substance in some
determinate state, i.e. with a complete set of modes, he
must be a causal agent not only in the existence of a
substance at the time of its creation, but also in its
having all the modes it has at that time.
Now, call any state of a created substance c after
its initial creation state a post-creation state of c, and
any state of c in which c is conserved in existence by God
a conservation state of c. Malebranche argues as follows:
Should God no longer will that there is a world; the
world is thereby annihilated. For assuredly the world
depends on the volitions of the creator. If the world
subsists, that is because God wills that it continues
to exist. On the part of God, the conservation of
creatures is nothing but their continued creation. .
.
Conservation and creation are simply a single volition
which, consequently, is necessarily followed by the same
effects (OC XII 156-7; D 152,3).
This passage bears a great burden for Malebranche. It
contains not only the premise necessary for the completion
of the argument for Thesis A, but also the basis of an
argument for the negative thesis. It is all orthodox
Cartesianism. First of all, it is clear that Malebranche
believes God's will to be a necessary condition for the
existence of any created being. So every post-creation
state is also a conservation state. But the conservation
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of created substances is simply "their continued
creation". So, every 'conservation state is also a
creation state. Hence, every post-creation state is a
creation state. Since God is a real causal agent in every
creation state of every created substance, it follows that
God is a real causal agent in every state of every
substance. That is Thesis A.
It might be thought that Malebranche is all the way
to occasionalism already. God creates every state of
every state of every substance. However, he himself
clearly felt the need for further argument in order to
establish his negative thesis concerning natural
causation
:
B: For every created substance c, state s and time t, if
c is in s at t, then there is no created substance c'
such that c’ is a real causal agent in c's being in s
at t.
Malebranche must have been conscious of the prevalent
philosophical orthodoxy with respect to causation,
according to which Thesis A is true but not incompatible
with natural causal activity. That is the doctrine of
theism. God concurs with created agents in bringing about
natural states of affairs. Thesis B effectively denies
the possibility of concurrence between divine and human
agents
.
Thesis A may be read in two ways. To see this it
will be helpful to review some of the terminology from
88
Chapter I. God efficaciously wills that state of affairs
s obtains if and only if God wills that s obtains and
God's willing that s obtains is a direct cause of s's
obtaining. God pre-conditions a state of affairs s if and
only if God efficaciously wills that circumstances c
obtain and knows that if c obtain then s will be brought
about by some independent cause. God concurs in state of
affairs s if and only if God efficaciously wills that s
obtains and some other agent a is a direct causal agent in
s's obtaining. God fully efficaciously wills that state
of affairs s obtains if and only if God efficaciously
wills that s obtains but does not concur in s.
God's pre-conditioning any state of affairs is
precluded for Malebranche by the fact that the means of
God's causal agency is always his efficacious will. Since
God is a real causal agent in every state of every
substance, he efficaciously wills every state of every
substance. However, the causal agency of Thesis A could
yet be either concurrence or fully efficacious willing.
Malebranche must establish the latter if he is to
establish occasionalism.
I believe that the passage from section vii of
Dialogue VII (OC XII 156-7; D 152,3) quoted above contains
an essential premise of Mai ebranche ' s argument for Thesis
B. God's willing that some created substance c be in a
certain state s is a necessary condition for c's being in
89
s. Granted that God's volition that c be in s is not a
necessary condition for any other state of any substance,
c included, 18 it follows that no state of affairs other
than God s willing it can be a sufficient condition for
c's being in s. Now Malebranche held that a cause is
always a sufficient condition for its effect (I take this
to be the force of his claim that a real cause is that
"between which and its effect the mind perceives a
necessary connection" (OC II 316; LO 450).) Since no
created substance or state thereof is a sufficient
condition for any state of any substance, no created
substance is a real cause of any state of any substance.
That is thesis B, and it is my claim that Malebranche
arrives at this thesis without employing any non-Cartesian
premises
.
After Malebranche has defended a version of this
argument against the worries of his interlocutor in
Dialogue VII, he summarizes in this way:
It is this that needs to be explained in order to make
reason agree with experience... God communicates his
power to creatures and unites them among themselves only
in the sense that he establishes their modalities as
occasional causes of the effects which he produces
himself; occasional causes, I say, which determine the
efficacy of his volitions, in consequence of the natural
laws that he has prescribed for himself... (OC XII 160-
1; D 158,9)
.
Experience teaches us that there is a constant and orderly
connection between states of affairs in the natural world.
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As Ariste has put it in the same Dialogue, "one says only
what one knows whenever one proposes that bodies act on
spirits... Experience does not permit one to doubt this"
(OC X 150—1; D 146-8, 149). This appearance of natural
causal interaction needs to be explained given the denial
that this is real causation. The exact details of this
appearance-saving component are spread throughout
Mai ebranche ' s work, and some of them will be examined in
the next chapter. The essential feature is that what
explains the appearance of causal activity among creatures
is the regularity of God's action. Whenever circumstances
are repeated the consequences are repeated. States of
affairs in the world are related by laws. Malebranche
tells us that the laws of nature are merely God's general
volitions and that these volitons are directed towards
particular effects by antecedent conditions. Occasional
causes "determine the effects" of God's volitions.
I believe that essentially he held to something like
this thesis:
C: For every pair of created substances c and c', state
s and time t, c ' is an occasional causal agent in c's
being in s at t if and only if
(a) c is in s at t, and
(b) there is a state s' and a relation R and a time
t' such that
(i) t is not prior to t'
(ii) s' is a state of c' at t'
(iii) c' stands in R to c
(iv) there is a natural law that implies that if
c' is in s' at t' and stands in R to c,
then c is in s at t.
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Exactly what this thesis involves is central to the debate
between Malebranche and Arnauld. Arnauld held that if
God's volitons are all of them general and require to be
directed toward their effect by particular occasional
causes, then two consequences follow. First, God's action
is imperfect, like that of a prince or a bishop who makes
general decrees but does not control their particular
execution and effects; and second, occasional causes must
have some efficacy, i.e. they must be real causes. These
objections, and other issues from the debate will be
discussed in Chapter IV.
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Notes
1* The third edition of the Search
,
published in 1677-8,
contained for the first time a set of elucidations
written by Malebranche in response to sundry informal
criticisms he had solicited. These are found in Volume
III of the Oeuvres Completes de Malebranche as well as
in the English translation by Lennon and Olscamp.
2. OC volume X, especially Meditation V.
3. Although he never says so explicitly, I think it is
clear that Malebranche thinks of a cause as something
exercising a genuine power. This probably seemed so
obvious to him that it was not worth remarking. The
passage quoted from Search VI, ii, 3 continues "if we
consider our idea of a cause or power to act..." (OC II
311 ; LO 446)
.
4. See OC II 315; LO 450.
5. The first misuse seems relevant here. We experience
certain sensations on the occasion of perceiving
objects and we are apt to explain these sensations by
positing qualities in them which cause our sensations
and which our sensations exactly resemble. It is
interesting to note that at the time Malebranche was
writing the Search
,
Locke was formulating his view
according to which we are apt to confuse our sensations
with the qualities in objects which they represent.
There is no reason to suppose that there is anything in
bodies corresponding to our sensations of them.
Nonetheless, Locke was committed to the idea that our
sensations are caused by powers in the objects.
6. OC II 312; LO 447. The reference to leeks and onions
is to a story in Exodus.
7. See Chapter II, page 50.
8. OC II 315; LO 449.
9. See Chapter II, pages 43-6; LO 223.
10. See, for example, OA XXXIX 190.
11. For an interesting introduction to this issue see R. C.
Sleigh Jr. "Leibniz on Malebranche on Causality" in J.
A. Cover and Mark Kulstad, eds . Central Themes in Early
Modern Phi losophy (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991).
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12. See, for example, Daisie Radner Ma 1 ebranc he (Chapter
II), Steven M. Nadler "Occasionalism and the Mind-Body
Problem and Charles McCracken Malebranche and Modern
British Philosophy (Chapter 3).
13. See Chapter I, note 1.
14. This is in contrast to the claim of Steven M. Nadler in
"Occasionalism and the Mind-Body Problem" in which he
says "It is significant for my thesis if Malebranche,
perhaps the most important and well known of the
occasional ists
,
did not present his occasionalism in
response to the mind-body problem either in whole or in
part. In fact, close examination of the relevant texts
reveals that none of the arguments Malebranche offers
for denying real mind-body interaction... exhibits a
concern for the special conceptual problem." The
conceptual problem referred to is that of the
conceivabi 1 ity of two substances as radically different
as mind and body acting on oneanother. As I pointed
out in Chapter I, I believe that Nadler' s essential
thesis in this paper is correct, that occasionalism in
Ma 1 ebranche ' s hands is a general theory of causality
and not just a theory of mind-body interaction, but it
is certainly not to be overlooked that the argument of
Dialogue VII appears in the context of just this
conceptual concern. Surely it must be construed as
showing "a special concern for the conceptual problem."
15. In addition to representing a naive Cartesian, Ariste
also sometimes plays the role of the scholastic,
sometimes of the acute layman, and, most often, of the
Renaissance playboy.
16. See Chapter II, section B3
.
17. This is good Cartesianism . A substance's modes are
simply the way in which that substance exists. Since a
substance must exist in some way when it is created, it
must be created with some determinate set of modes.
18. Malebranche holds that there is no necessary connection
between one state of a substance and another state of
that substance for this reason. We may regard a state
as a kind of temporal slice. Since God could cease to
maintain his conservation of the world at any time,
nothing can follow necessarily about future states of a
substance from the fact that it is in a given state at
a given time. The case is not so straightforward in
the case of no necessary connections between states of
distinct substances. Malebranche, being a good
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Cartesian, regards motion as irreducibly relational.
So if we are to say that part of the state of substance
c at a certain time is that it has a certain motion, it
is hard to see how this can fail to be necessarily
dependent on certain other substances being in the
relevant states.
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CHAPTER IV
DIVINE AND NATURAL ACTIVITY
Having seen how Malebranche argues for the general
theses of occasionalism and what those theses amount to,
it is time to examine some of the particular points of
detail dealt with in the Treatise
. The Treatise on Nature
and Grace
,
as its title suggests, is devoted to an
examination of the way in which God acts both in the realm
of nature and in the realm of grace. The latter area is
immensely complex. It is often very hard to keep a fast
eye on the issues. Fortunately, for the purposes of this
dissertation, a close examination of Mai ebranche '
s
doctrine on grace and freedom and of Arnauld's criticisms
of it is not essential . The reward I hope to reap from an
examination of Mai ebranche ' s debate with Arnauld is a
clearer understanding of the relationship between
Mai ebranche ' s occasionalism and Leibniz' theory of
concomitance or pre-established harmony. This end can be
attained by concentrating on the what Malebranche and
Arnauld have to say about God's activity in the realm of
nature
.
In this chapter, I will devote my attention to two
questions concerning the details of agency according to
occasionalism, each of which much exercised Arnauld. The
first concerns element A in my presentation of
Ma 1 ebranche ' s theory - that God is the total real cause of
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every state of every being. How is God's causal activity
to be understood with respect to the effects that he
produces? A satisfactory answer to this question is
central to Mai ebranche
' s theodicean purposes in the
Treatise
. The second question concerns the role of
occasional causes. In what sense is it said that they
"determine the efficacy" of God's will? Arnauld devotes
the whole of the first book of the Reflexions to attacking
Mai ebranche
' s answers to these two questions.
A. The Nature of Divine Action
We may call Thesis A of the account of occasionalism
presented in Chapter III Mai ebranche ' s positive doctrine.
In the first discourse of the Treatise
,
Mai ebranche '
s
principal aim is to expand on this doctrine by explaining
the way in which God acts in the conduct of the world. The
products of this are the derivation of the two fundamental
laws of physics - the law of the conservation of motion
and the law of distribution of motion on the occasion of
impact 1 - and an answer to the problem of evil. It is
primarily this latter problem that motivates Mai ebranche '
s
view of God's activity in the Treatise .
The details of Mai ebranche ' s account depend on the
distinction between general and particular volitions.
Malebranche claimed that in the ordinary course of nature
God only ever acts by general volitions. This seems to be
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the claim that Arnauld found more distressing than any
other in the Treatise
. A glance at the chapter headings
reveals that almost all of Book I of the Reflexion s is
devoted to refuting this. In this section, I shall attend
to what is involved in the distinction, to whether or not
Arnauld fully grasped it, and to the extent to which
Malebranche was able to deal with Arnauld's criticsms.
In part 1, I shall introduce Mai ebranche
' s treatment of
the problem of evil in the first discourse of the
> ib part 2, I shall explain Arnauld's objection
to Malebranche
' s account, and elucidate the distinction
between God's general and particular volitions; in part 3,
I shall discuss a defence of Malebranche suggested in a
paper by Steven M. Nadler, based on the claim that Arnauld
misunderstood Malebranche ' s account of God's action, and I
shall argue that Arnauld did not misunderstand
Mai ebranche ' s occasionalism, and that his objection stands
in need of rebuttal
.
1 . The Problem of Evi
1
First, we should turn to the Treatise itself, and to
Malebranche ' s treatment of the problem of evil. In part
one of the first discourse of the Treatise
,
Malebranche is
concerned to explicate the nature of God's activity in the
realm of nature.
What constitutes perfection in action? Malebranche
believes that there are two potentially conflicting
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measures of goodness in action, which are goodness of
effects and goodness of means. In article XII, he tells
us "the wisdom of God uncovers to him an infinity of ideas
of possible works and all the possible ways of executing
these designs" (OC V 27). What Malebranche calls
variously the effects, works ( ouvrages ) or designs
( desseins ) have their own measure of goodness. It is
richness, variety and abundance. 2 Meanwhile, the means
that an agent employs have their goodness measured in
terms of their simplicity and their fertility ( fecondite ):
An excellent workman must proportion his action to his
work; he does not do in very complicated ways what he
could execute more simply.... God, discovering in the
infinite vaults of his wisdom an infinity of possible
worlds, as the necessary consequences of the laws of
movements that he could establish, was determined to
create that which could be produced and conserved by the
most simple laws. (OC V 28)
For Malebranche, as for most of his contemporaries, the
means of God's action is always his efficacious will. We
are told in article XII to pay attention that "God has no
need of instruments in order to act; his volitions are
necessarily efficacious" (OC V 27). 2 So, in God,
simplicity of means cannot be a matter of economy of
effort or simplicity of instruments. Rather, it must be
in terms of two things - the number of volitions and the
simplicity of their content. A state of affairs is
brought about by the simplest means, for God, just in case
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it is brought about by the fewest volitions with the
simplest (presumably propositional) content, or else by
some balance of these.
With respect to the end. or dies s & i
n
of God 1 s action,
he informs us in article XIV that "God could have made a
world more perfect than that which we inhabit" (OC V 29).
For example, he could have made the rain always fall on
fertile ground, or never caused a child to be born with
monstrous limbs. Malebranche seems to believe that these
things could have been achieved at no cost in the rest of
the work. The world, measured in terms of effects, could
have been a better place. Malebranche believes,
nevertheless, that he can "justify the wisdom and bounty
of God in spite of the irregularities of nature, the
monsters, the sin and miseries to which we are subject"
(OC V 28-9). How is this possible?
The answer is relatively straightforward. Since
perfection of action is measured both in terms of means
and of ends, the most perfect agent must act with these in
balance. At the very start of the Treatise , in article I,
Malebranche establishes that God only acts for his own
glory. In the addition to article XIII, he draws this
consequence: "God wants his ways to be the most wise, as
well as his designs. He does not want the designs to
honour him while the ways dishonour him" (OC V 28). As a
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result, he must choose the combination of designs and ways
that "together most bear the character of his attributes".
The goodness of divine action is not determined by
the happiness it brings to humans. God did not create the
world for us, according to Ma 1 ebranche
.
4 Rather, God's
perfection in action is found in his acting in a way that
best reflects and glorifies his own attributes, among
which simplicity is of the greatest significance. If God
had chosen a world (i.e. a design) more perfect, he would
have had to act with less perfect simplicity. "He would
have had to multiply the laws of the communication of
movements by which our world subsists; and hence there
would no longer have been between the action of God and
his work that proportion which is essential in an
infinitely perfect being" (OC V 29).
Malebranche identifies the laws of nature with God's
general volitions. He has already established the
commonly accepted truth that God has no need of
instruments with which to act. For God, willing and
acting are the same thing. Yet he tells us that the laws
of motion are "the cause of all the movements which
produce that variety of forms that we admire in nature"
(OC V 30), and that reflection on the simplicity and
fertility of them makes it clear that they have been
chosen by an agent capable of producing "an infinity of
marvels by a very small number of volitions" (OC V 31).
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In the addition to article XIX he comes right out with the
following claim: "the general cause acts always by general
volitions or laws" (OC V 32). Clearly, for Malebranche,
to act by a general volition is the same thing as to act
by a general law. In the ensuing parts of this section, I
shall consider Arnauld's most often repeated criticism of
Malebranche
' s account of God's action - that God does not
act always in the course of nature by general volitions.
2 . General and Particular Volitions
In Book I of the Ref 1 exions Phi 1 osophiques et
Theo logiques sur le Nouveau Systeme de la Nature et de la
Grace
,
Arnauld carries on a sustained campaign against
Malebrache's claim that, in the ordinary course of nature,
God acts only by general volitions. His objections are
all of them based on the supposition that Malebranche has
misrepresented what it is to act by general volitions:
He takes for the same thing to act by general volitions
and to act according to general laws. However, this is
just what must not be confounded, the latter being very
different from the former, to speak exactly, as he
professes to do. Because the laws are the order
according to which things are done, and the volitions
are (above all in God) that by which things are done.
(OA XXXIX 175, emphasis in text.)
On Arnauld's view, it is quite right to say that God, for
the most part, acts in accordance with general laws. But
the result of Ma 1 ebranche ' s equivocation is that he is led
to thinking that it is by the laws that God always acts.
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For a variety of reasons, according to Arnauld, this is
unacceptable, and it is against this notion, that the laws
are God's volitions and the means by which he brings about
particular effects, that he is arguing.
(i) Particular causes for particular effects. The
first reason Arnauld gives against God's acting by general
volitions is that "everything that happens, happens in
particular, and never in general. Now, willing and acting
being, in God, the same thing, since he creates each soul
by a particular action, it must be that he wills also to
create it by a particular volition" (OA XXXIX 175). This
argument depends on the following idea. A particular
effect must have a particular cause, the cause of that
effect. The existence, for example, of a particular soul
s, must be the effect of a particular action, the creation
of s. Since the act of the creation of s is a volition of
God, that volition must itself be particular - the
volition to create s.
This first argument is more serious, I think, than it
seems. It appears to be open to the rather obvious
objection that, as Malebranche points out, there is no
serious difficulty with the view that one cause can have
more than one effect. God's general volitions may have an
infinity of particular effects. But I believe that
Arnauld has a siginifcant point to make.
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Let's take another example, since an occasion of
creation, if that is taken to mean the initial instant of
the creation of some substance, is not, in Mai ebranche
'
s
view, part of the ordinary course of nature. Suppose that
there is some created substance c such that c comes to
have mode F at time t. On Mai ebranche
' s view, the cause
of c's coming to have F at t is a general volition of God,
by which Arnauld takes Malebranche to mean a law of
nature. Consider the following two volition contents:
A: Let c be F at t
B: For all created substances x and y and every time tj,
if x is G at t-^ and bears relation R to y then there
is a time t 2 such that y is F at t 2 .
Arnauld interprets Malebranche as claiming that all of
God's volitions in the ordinary course of nature are of
the form of B. The proposition 'c is F at t' follows
necessarily from God's having a volition of form A, but
not from his having a volition of form B. Only some
particular conditions in association with B will bring
about c’s being F at t. Now, Mai ebranche ' s view is that
God is, in fact, responsible for bringing it about that
the appropriate antecedent conditions hold.
But now we may see the thrust of Arnauld' s first
argument. If God brings it about that antecedent
conditions combine with his general will to procure the
outcome that c is F at t, does he will that c is F at t or
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not? Surely, God brings this about because he has chosen
c s being F at t as being among the most preferred states
of affairs. But if that is so, isn't it equally sure that
he has a volition of form A, which, as was pointed out, is
a particular volition sufficient for its particular
effect. According to Arnauld, the true picture must be
that God has a particular volition for each state of
affairs s in the world, a volition of the form "let it be
that s obtains". In the ordinary course of nature, these
states of affairs will be in accordance with general laws,
although that is not to say that those laws will be the
cause of the states of affairs. "All one can say
exactly," he summarizes, "is that God acts by particular
volitions in consequence of general laws; which is far
from being able to say, what the author says on every
page, that the universal cause never acts at all by
particular volitions " (OA XXXIX 175, emphasis in
original )
.
(ii) Two senses of 'general cause'. Arnauld argues
that the expression 'general cause' is equivocal, and that
one sense appropriately describes the nature of God's
action while the other most certainly does not. 5 In
article v of Chapter I of the Reflexions , he argues that
someone committed to the view that God never acts (at
least in the ordinary course of nature) by particular
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volitions is thereby committed to the view that the
inadequate concept of a general cause applies to God.
In the first sense, a general cause is an agent that
only has a concern for the general, as is the case with a
king "who governs his kingdom by general orders, but who
cannot himself ordinarily see to it that they are well
executed; like a bishop who has a general care for his
diocese, but who cannot, by himself, attend to each soul
in particular" (OA XXXIX 178). The other sense is that of
an agent who has a particular and immediate care for
everything. In this sense, the generality comes from the
scope of the agent's activity. It extends to everything,
whereas in the former sense, the generality was a matter
of the mode of activity.
Arnauld points out that an agent that only ever acts
by general volitions can only be called a "general cause"
in the first sense. Suppose that substance c has property
F at time t. If God does not have a particular volition
'let c be F at t
'
,
then God cannot be said to have a
particular care for the state of c. That substance's
being F at t must be an unforeseen and unwilled
consequence of more general volitions that God has without
regard to their consequences. If on the other hand, he
has the general volitons he has because he wishes to bring
about particular effects, then he must antecedently have
had the relevant particular volitions, for example "let c
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F at t . And such volitions are, of course,
necessarily efficacious. In short, if God never acts by
i cu 1 ar volitions, then particular consequences such as
c's being F at t cannot be among the choices he makes. He
must be like the king who forms laws with no regard to
particular instances. This is surely unworthy of God.
(iii) Simplicity of ways. Arnauld presses this last
point home in article vii of Chapter I, in which he draws
a distinction between two ways in which the simplicity of
divine action can be understood, one of which, he tells
us, is accurate "but completely useless for the intentions
of the author" (OA XXXIX 180), the other of which has no
truth in it at all.
In article vi
,
Arnauld has pointed out that
Malebranche takes for the same thing acting by general
volitions, acting by general laws and acting by simple
means. 6 For Malebranche, God must, in creating the world,
balance simplicity of means against richness and diversity
of effects. The picture that Arnauld finds no truth in,
is that in which God's choice at creation is simply one of
means. God chooses to produce whatever world comes about
by those laws which are very simple yet at the same time
very fertile, fertile enough to produce "an infinity of
marvels by a very small number of volitions" (OC V 31).
Obviously, what is wrong with this picture is that, if God
is only choosing laws, he seems to have no regard or care
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for particular effects, only that, whatever those effects
may be, they should be rich, abundant and varied.
The alternative picture is that according to which
God "acts by the simplest means in accordance with his
designs (OA XXXIX 180, my emphasis)
. According to this
picture, God chooses the world that he desires and
considers the simplest means of achieving it. Arnauld
recognizes that Malebranche seems to have something like
this in mind in article xii of the Treatise wherein he
says: "the wisdom of God uncovers to him an infinity of
possible works and the possible ways of executing his
designs" (OC V 27). But he points out that this is not
compatible with the view that God always acts by general
volitions. If God's first action is to survey and choose
a world, including all its substances and all its temporal
states, he must, in so choosing, have particular volitions
for each of those states.
The fact that neither of these picturs perfectly
represents Malebranche ' s account does not hinder Arnauld'
s
argument. As has been pointed out, God, in Mai ebranche '
s
view, does not choose the best possible design, and then
look for the best means to bring that design about. In
order to balance perfection of means and ends, he is
constrained to choose a design that is less perfect than
the best. But whatever happens, either he chooses this
design in all its detail or it comes about so to speak by
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Arnauld
'
s
accident as a result of the means he chooses,
objection is that, if God always acts by general
volitions, it must be the latter.
All of Arnauld
' s criticisms of Mai ebranche
' s view
that God only acts by general volitions seem to hinge
around the following idea. If God does not have a
particular volition with respect to each state of affairs,
then he cannot have chosen each state of affairs. For
God, to choose is to have a volition. If he chooses state
of affairs s, he does this by willing "let it be that s".
Similarly, if he does not will "let it be that s" he has
not chosen s. This is contrary to Providence.
On the other hand, if, as Arnauld thinks he must,
Malebranche is required to admit a particular volition for
every state of affairs, then Mai ebranche ' s strategy for
avoiding the problem of evil is undermined. Malebranche
was able to sustain the compatibility of evil with God's
justice by saying that he does not have a particular
7
volition for particular evils.
It has been argued elsewhere that Arnauld simply
misunderstood Mai ebranche ' s conception of acting by
general volition. In the next part of this section, I
shall consider that argument.
3 . Nadler * s Defence of Malebranche
There is some question about the correct way to
interpret Malebranche on the issue of God's action in the
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world. Traditionally, his view has been understood to
involve that God is constantly and actively engaged in the
moment to moment progress of the world, that is to say
that he always acts by what Arnauld understands as
particular volitions. There is a very reasonable basis
for this. In what was described in Chapter III as his
best argument for the occasional ist position, Malebranche
establishes his view that God's conservation of the world
is in principle indistinguishable from his creation of it.
Malebranche uses this point to establish that at each
moment God effectively "recreates" each substance with all
its modes. Steven Nadler has recently argued that this
shows that "Ma 1 ebranche ' s God must be directly and
immediately responsible for each and every particular
effect in nature; that is that God's activity as efficient
O
cause must be constant, ubiquitous and necessary." I
think this is the position that Leibniz considers unworthy
of God in the correspondence with Arnauld (see Chapter V),
and also the one that Arnauld says is not implied by
occasionalism in a letter to Leibniz of March 4th 1687.
Nadler recognizes Arnauld' s divergence from the "trad-
itional" reading. His paper is intended to defend the
"traditional" reading against Arnauld 's interpretation.
The dispute over the correct interpretation arises
with respect to whether God's acting in accordance with
natural laws means his engaging in, as Nadler would have
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it, "an infinite number of discrete temporalized acts"
each in accordance with the laws of nature, or means
simply willing the laws of nature (and presumably the
initial state of the world) and thereby, and with no
further volitions, producing the world in its temporal
entirety. This latter interpretation is Arnauld's and is
more in keeping, apparently, with the idea that God always
acts by general volitions.
Unfortunately, Mai ebranche is very equivocal on this
point in the Treatise
. On the one hand, he says that the
laws themselves are "so simple, so natural, yet at the
same time so fertile" that God is able to "work an
infinity of marvels with a very small number of volitions"
(art. xvii, OC V 31), and he talks about certain events
being the "necessary consequences" of the laws and the
laws "producing" certain effects, all of which strongly
suggests that he has in mind the latter of the two
interpretations in mind. On the other hand, in the First
gElucidation added to later editions of the Treatise , he
writes
:
I say that God acts by general volitions, whenever he
acts in consequence of the general laws that he has
established. For example, I say that God acts in me by
general volition, when he makes me feel pain on the
occasion of my being pricked; because according to the
general and efficacious laws of the union of the soul
and body, he makes me suffer pain whenever my body is
indisposed. (OC V 147)
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Nadi er reads this passage as suggesting that, at the time
when I am pricked, God then and there makes me feel pain
in order that his actions remain in accord with the laws
of union of mind and body
. Any other action he chose (my
being annihilated or my feeling no pain) would be
irregular and hence unworthy of him.
So on the one hand, Arnauld has argued that
Malebranche conflates acting by general volitions with
acting by general laws, when in fact all that can be said
of God’s action is that he acts according to general laws.
On the other hand, Nadler has argued that Arnauld has
misinterpreted what it is, on Mai ebranche ' s view, for God
to act by general volitions. On Nadler' s account, we need
to distinguish between acting by a general volition and
bringing something about with a general volition. 10 The
former means simply to act in accordance with general laws
even though each effect is brought about with a distinct
particular volition.
Whatever the status of the position taken in the
Treatise and its subsequent amendments, the Dialogues seem
to lend themselves unequivocally to Arnauld’
s
interpretation. In Dialogue VI, Mai ebranche ' s spokesman,
Theodore, says that the laws of the union of body and soul
are "nothing but the constant and efficacious volitions of
the creator" (D 132,3). In Dialogue XI, he says:
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At the time of creation, God constructed animals and
plants for future centuries. He established laws of
motion necessary for making them grow. Now he is at
rest because he does no more than follow these laws...
Everything is done in relation to the laws of motion,
laws which are so simple and so natural that, although
God does everything by means of them in the ordinary"
course of his Providence, it seems that he affects
nothing, in short that he is at rest." (D 252,3)
Now, for both Malebranche and Arnauld, there is something
odd about this last statement. Both believed that God's
activity takes place outside time. Time is merely an
ordering concept with application to creation. The idea
that God is now at rest, just like Leibniz’ idea that God
pre-established a harmony among substances, is a helpful
device for getting to understand a rather more complicated
thesis. But surely the idea in each case is that God has
just those volitions sufficient for the initial state of
the universe along with its laws. No additional volitions
are necessary. In fact, at the very point where
Malebranche presents his argument based on the equivalence
of creation and conservation (which was supposed to lend
most credence to the traditional interpretation) he makes
almost exactly this point. He says "the conservation of
creatures is on the part of God simply a continued
creation, simply the same volition which subsists and
operates unceasingly" (D 156,7). The point is not that
creation and conservation are the same kind of action for
God, but that they are the very same action.
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It seems that Mai ebranche
' s conception of the
contents of God's volitions is something like this. There
are particular volitions, with particular times associated
with them. God wills, for example, that at the first
instant of creation Adam should be a ful 1~grown man, or
that at time t the water turns into wine. Note that this
is different from saying "God wills at t that the water
turns into wine". On the other hand there are general
volitions which have no associated time. The contents of
these are the general laws. No volition of God's itself
happens at a time. They are all eternal, and the content
of God's will is unchanging. The effects of the
particular volitions will occur at the relevant times but
that is not to say that that is when the volitions occur.
The effects of the general volitions will be spread out
over time. Of course, no volition of the form "if c is in
state s and is in relation R to c' then c' is in s'" will
have any particular consequence. Surely, when Malebranche
talks of the effects of God's general volitions, this is
elliptical for the effects of the combination of God's
general volitions and those particular volitions
concerning 'the initial state of creation. The entire
contents of his unchanging will, all of his volitions
taken together, are a sufficient condition for everything
that happens at all times in the world.
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At the end of part 2 of this section, I suggested
that Arnauld's objection to Mai ebranche
' s account of God's
action is a double edged sword. If God only acts by
general volitions, then he has no providential care for
particular individuals, but if he acts by particular
volitions, then he has a particular volition for each evil
state of affairs, and it is hard to see how he can avoid
culpability. Arnauld believed that there was promise of
escape from the latter difficulty, but that the former was
nothing but an egregious error with no redeeming features.
If I am right about the correct interpretation of
Mai ebranche ' s account, then he seems, on the face of it,
still subject to the former problem. This objection
rested on the following premise: if God chooses state of
affairs s then he has a particular volition for s;
contrapos it ive ly , if God fails to have a particular
volition for s then he has not chosen s.
It seems that Ma 1 ebranche ' s best hope for
circumventing this problem is to drive a wedge between
God's choosing a state of affairs s and God's willing that
s obtain. Can he do this? I think he can. In article
XII of the Treatise he says:
The wisdom of God uncovers to him an infinity of
different works, and all the possible ways of executing
his designs... Just as his wisdom is his own
intelligence, so his power is no different from his
will. (OC V 27)
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One reasonable way to interpret this is the following.
God's preference is a matter of his intellect, independent
of his will. In evaluating states of affairs, he may make
a judgement such as this: "s-^ would be preferable to s 2 ,
other things being equal." We may take this as a schema
for representing all of God's preferences in considering
possible designs for the world. The "other things" will
be other states of affairs with which s
^
or s 2 may be
combined to produce an entire plan or dessein for the
world. No such preference is an efficacious volition.
For one thing, other things are rarely equal. That is,
the choice between s-^ and s 2 , may well carry with it the
requirement that other choices need to be made. The most
preferable overall design will be the one that maximizes
preferability of particular states of affairs within it.
God will have intellectual preferences not just for
simple states of affairs, but for complex ones as well.
Take the complex state of affairs of the existence of such
and such a world w-^. Now consider the claim that God
prefers w^ to any other world. On the schema for
representing God's preferences suggested above, we can
represent this preference as follows: "For any world wR
such that wn is not identical with w 1( w x would
be
preferable to wn , other things being equal." But
in the
case of worlds, other things always are equal. There are
no additional states of affairs that the choice of w x
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would bear with it that might require to be taken into
consideration. A world is a fully determinate set of
states of affairs. This is my contention. The
preference of one world over any other is no more an
efficacious volition than any other preference. It is a
purely intellectual act for God, a judgement about a
property had by a certain possible world. This is obvious
if we consider that God was under no obligation to create
any world at all. This is because God is absolutely free
with respect to creation. Even so, absent such an
obligation, he still may (perhaps must) form a preference.
If God's preference of the world he chose to create
is not identical with his willing to create it, then we
may save his Providence by saying that he chooses to
create that world which, having considered all its states,
he prefers to all others, while still claiming that the
content of his volition is merely the initial state of
creation and the laws of nature. He does not need an
efficacious particular volition for each state of each
individual in order to be said to have a care for each
individual
.
B . The Activity o_f Created Substances
I will conclude this chapter by giving brief
consideration to a different type of objection raised by
Arnauld in Book I of the Reflexions . In Chapter I,
article iii, he tells us with respect to occasional causes
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that, according to Malebranche, "it would not be God who
determined these causes to place the condition following
which the effect would be produced; but it would be these
causes that determined the volition of God to such and
such an effect" (OA XXXIX 176). Arnauld is concerned
about the third component of occasionalism. It is natural
to see that as a qualifying clause to the second, the
negative thesis of occasionalism. Although there is no
real creaturely causation, there appears to be, and Thesis
C explains that appearance. Arnauld appears to be worried
that Malebranche is bringing in creaturely causation
through the back door.
The idea that the efficacy of God's volitions should
be subject to the dispositions of creatures has obviously
suspect theological associations. Malebranche asserts
that Arnauld has simply misunderstood what is involved in
his doctrine. In this section, I want to consider whether
or not there is, as some have claimed, 11 a relatively
harmless way of construing Ma 1 ebranche ' s Thesis C so as to
prevent it from being subject to the charge of admitting
real creaturely causation.
Arnauld' s objection is very straightforward.
Malebranche has said that God's volitions in the ordinary
course of nature are all of them general. In order to
have a particular effect they must be "determined" to that
effect by occasional causes. For example, suppose that
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part of the world that God prefers includes the state of
affairs of created substance c's being F at time t. What,
on Mai ebranche
' s view, is the cause of that state of
affairs? God has a general volition which implies the
following: for any two substances x and y and time t-^, if
x is G at t
x
and x bears relation R to y then there is a
time t 2 such that t 2 is not prior to t x and y is F at t 2 .
Obviously, this general volition, with its conditional
form, cannot itself have the particular effect that c is
F at t. Arnauld believes that Malebranche is committed to
the view that the true cause of c's being F at t is a
combination of the general volition of God and the state
of affairs of some other substance c''s being G at a time
t' prior to t and bearing R to c . Without the latter, the
former has no effect.
Arnauld took this to mean that occasional causes as
Malebranche explains them must be genuinely efficacious.
Malebranche has said that the concept of a cause is of
that between which and its effect there exists a necessary
connection. I want to pass by the question of what kind
of necessity is involved here. It has been contended
elsewhere that Mai ebranche 1 s notion of causal necessity is
of straight metaphysical necessity. I don't see the
evidence for this, but as a matter of fact Arnauld 's
objection has the same standing whether the necessity is
metaphysical or some weaker notion. Malebranche believes
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that x is the real cause of y if and only if x is a
sufficient condition for y (a causally sufficient
condition, whatever that may amount to).
Now, the primary notion of a cause, for both
Ma 1 ebranche and Arnauld is, of an agent. The candidate
suggested above is a complex state of affairs. How can we
reduce the claim that this complex state of affairs is the
cause of c’s being F at t, to a claim about agent
causation, about which agent or agents is or are the
cause?
Suppose that every state of affairs s that
constitutes a causally sufficient condition for some other
state of affairs s' may be construed as the state of
affairs of a certain subtance's having a certain property
or properties, or else of several substances having
certain properties. We can say that a substance c is a
real causal agent in bringing about s' if and only if
there is a state of affairs s such that s is the state of
affairs of c's having properties through Fn , s obtains
and either s is a causally sufficient condition for s' or
else there is a set of states of affairs A such that s is
a member of A, each member of A obtains, the members of A
are together causally sufficient for s', and for any
member s’’ of A, the members of A without s ' 1 are not
together a causally sufficient condition for s’ to obtain.
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Now, in our example, c's being F at t was caused by a
combination of God’s having a certain general volition and
of c''s being G at t' and bearing R to c. It should be
clear that c' satisfies the conditions presented above for
being a real causal agent in c's being F at t. There is a
state of affairs which is the state of affairs of c''s
having certain properties (those of being G at t‘ and
bearing relation R to c), this state of affairs obtains
and there is a set which has for its members this state of
affairs and one other (God’s having the general volition
described above) and these two states of affairs are
together causally sufficient for c's being F at t, while
neither alone is.
Construed this way, Arnauld's objection strikes me,
at least, as very persuasive. Since he is committed to
the view that a causal power is to be explicated purely in
terms of necessary connection, Malebranche has to reject
the reduction of state-of-af fairs causality to agent
causality limned above, and substitute something else in
its place. Needless to say, he never does this, so it is
hardly worth speculating on what he would or would not say
in this matter. The account suggested certainly seems
plausible to me.
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CHAPTER V
OCCASIONALISM IN LEIBNIZ' CORRESPONDENCE WITH ARNAULD
In the paper "First Truths", 1 Leibniz writes the
foil owing
:
The diversity of the body and soul once having been
supposed, their union can be explained., without the
common hypothesis of an influence, which cannot be
understood, and without the hypothesis of occasional
causes, which appeals to a God ex machina
. For God has
thus established the soul along with the body from the
beginning with so much wisdom and artifice, that from
thie original constitution and notion of each,
everything which happens in one through itself
corresponds perfectly to that which happens in the
other, just as if something had passed over from the one
into the other, which I call the hypothesis of
concomitance. (C 521; L 269)
For Leibniz, as for other seventeenth century philosphers,
an adequate account of the metaphysics of causation must
explain the appearance of mind-body interaction. It is
2
evident from this passage, as from many subsequent, that
Leibniz thought that there were three principal contenders
for such an account: the "hypothesis of an influx", that
of "occasional causes" and, the account championed by
Leibniz himself, the "hypothesis of concomitance". In
this chapter, I will consider Leibniz' main objections to
occasional ism
.
In "First Truths", occasionalism is held to be
inferior to Leibniz' position on the grounds that it
appeals to a continual miraculous intervention, "a God ex
machina"
,
in order to explain mind-body interactions. The
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objection is neither pursued nor argued for. However,
when Leibniz raises the same objection in his
correspondence with Antoine Arnauld
,
3 Arnauld resists the
former s characterization of occasionalism, suggesting
that the theory is, in fact, indistinguishable from
Leibniz' own "hypothesis of concomitance.". Leibniz is
subsequently forced to defend the 'continual miracle'
objection, and in so doing, extends the objection beyond
mind-body interactions to claim that all apparent
interactions between substances of any kind are cases of
miraculous divine activity.
In part A, I shall examine Leibniz' first formulation
of the 'continual miracle' argument against occasionalism
in the correspondence with Arnauld. Arnauld suggests that
this argument rests on a misinterpretation. I suggest
that, at least with respect to Mai ebranche '
s
occasionalism, Arnauld is right. I will then show that,
once this misinterpretation has been cleared up, Leibniz'
first formulation of the argument cannot establish more
than a factual difference between the two theories. In
part B, I shall direct my attention to what I regard as
Leibniz' most serious consideration of the 'continual
miracle’ objection, and I shall present a version of the
theory of concomitance based on Leibniz' rejection of one
of the central components of occasionalism. In part C, I
shall move beyond the correspondence with Arnauld to
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consider briefly another objection to occasionalism from a
later period.
First of all, a reminder of what Ma 1 ebranche
'
s
version of occasionalism amounts to. 4 it is contained in
these three theses:
A: For every created substance c, state s and time t, if
c is in s at t, then God is a real causal agent in
c's being in s at t.
B: For every created substance c, state s and time t, if
c is in s at t, then there is no created substance c'
such that c' is a real causal agent in c's being in s
at t
.
state
in c's
For every pair of created substances c and c',
s and time t, c’ is an occasional causal agent
being in s at t if and only if
(a) c is in s at t, and
(b) there is a state s' and a relation R and a
time t' such that
(i) t is not prior to t'
(ii) s' is a state of c' at t'
(iii) c’ stands in R to c
(iv) there is a natural law that implies
that if c' is in s' at t ' and stands
in R to c, then c is in s at t.
The language of the three theses serves very well in the
consideration of what was and what was not common ground
between occasionalism and the theory of concomitance. I
think it is fair to say that Leibniz accepted in outline
the Cartesian (and Malebranchian) substance/mode ontology
(although this claim has to be tempered by the observation
that Leibniz recognized the existence of substantial
forms). 5 The language of agent causation appears
throughout the relevant parts of the correspondence, with
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substances being the relevant category for causal agents
and states of substances being the relevant category for
effects. I take states of substances to be composed of
modes of those substances. 6
So much for the language, what about the theses
themselves? Leibniz accepted A. 7 But note that A is a
fairly weak claim. It does not discount the possibility
of creaturely co-operation. In fact, something akin to A
was common currency among Christian philosophers of this
period. Descartes certainly held something like it, as
did Arnauld. 8
Leibniz was also not poorly disposed towards C. In
the letter to Arnauld of April 30, 1687, he writes this:
I do not at all disapprove when one calls minds the
occasional causes, and even in a certain way real
causes, of the movements of bodies; for, with respect to
the divine resolves, whatever God has foreseen and pre-
ordained with respect to minds, has been an occasion for
his first regulating bodies in such a way that they
would agree among themselves, following the laws and
forces that he has given them. (LA 95; RL 68)
Some explanation is clearly in order here. Put simply,
there are two substances involved - my mind and my body.
Each state of my mind is a natural consequence of its
antecedent state, i.e. it follows according to the laws of
the mind, and each state of my body is a natural
consequence of its antecedent state, following according
to the laws of bodies. God has brought it about that each
126
state of my mind will "agree" with the contemporaneous
state of my body, so that, at the moment I will that my
arm be raised, my body will be so disposed (as a result of
its own prior states and in accordance with the laws of
bodies) that, external conditions permitting, my arm will
be raised.
One could regard as a kind of derivative law of
nature, any generalization of this kind relating states of
minds to states of bodies or vice-versa. Such a
derivative law would play the appropriate role in conjunct
(iv) of condition (b) in thesis C, engendering a
Leibnizian version of that thesis. Note, though, that,
for Leibniz, the primary notion of a natural law is of a
general rule relating different states of one substance . 9
In this sense, what I have called a derivative natural law
is not a real law of nature. This will be discussed in
part B
.
The language of mind-body interaction should not
obscure the fact that it is true, for Leibniz, of all
substances, that they correspond to one another in such a
way that it is often appropriate, for example in physics,
to speak as if one were causally influencing another . 10
Hence we can form derivative natural laws concerning
relationships between states of substances of all kinds.
Leibniz wants to say that "to speak in metaphysical
rigour", there is no real intersubstant ial causal
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influence. 11 Corresponding to the distinction between
primary and derivative natural laws, it makes sense, then,
to distinguish between primary and derivative Leibnizian
occasional causation, this distinction depending on the
kind of law playing the relevant role in Ma 1 ebranche
’
s
Thesis C.
Leibniz parts company with Malebranche at Thesis B,
as his second argument will demonstrate. What will be
surprising is how little adjustment in the wording is
required to make a big theoretical difference.
A. The First Formulation of the 1 Continual Miracle
’
Argument
In his longer letter dated July 4th/14th 1686
(Leibniz sent two to Arnauld with this dating), Leibniz
says this:
The hypothesis of occasional causes is not satisfactory
to a philosopher, it seems to me. For it introduces a
sort of continual miracle, as though God at every moment
was changing the laws of bodies on the occasion of
thoughts of minds, or was changing the regular course of
the thoughts of the soul by exciting in it other
thoughts on the occasion of the movements of bodies; and
in general as though God were to intervene otherwise, in
ordinary matters, than in conserving each substance in
its course and in the laws established for it. There is
thus only the hypothesis of concomitance or the
agreement of substances among themselves which explains
all this in a manner wholly conceivable and worthy of
God... God created the soul from the start in such a way
that ordinarily it has no need of these changes. (LA 65;
RL 45)
As we are about to see, Arnauld took the main thrust
of the objection to be that it is unworthy of God that he
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should have to be constantly employed in the conduct of
the world. According' to Leibniz' view, God's original
creative act was sufficient to endow each substance with
all the properties necessary for its natural career. The
causal agency of God referred to in thesis A is hardly an
agency at all on this view, but rather a merely passive
concourse (whatever that may amount to). A similar
argument appears in a number of places, but perhaps is
most explicit in his Clarification in answer to objections
*1 O
raised by Pierre Bayle. * Reviewing alternative
explanations of mind-body interaction, Leibniz rejects the
occasional ist account as being "somewhat as if a man were
charged with constantly synchronizing two bad clocks which
are in themselves incapable of according with eachother"
(G IV 520; L 494). Leibniz claims that his own view is
"just as possible as the system of a supervisor, and more
worthy of the author of these substances" - more worthy,
presumably, because an artifact that requires constant
supervision is a bad artifact.
Arnauld's reply appeals to an example in which he
considers what account can be given of the raising of his
arm when he wills that it be raised. Rehearsing the terms
of Leibniz' explanation, he concludes:
It seems to me that this is saying the same thing in
other terms as those who claim that my will is the
occasional cause of the movement of my arm and that God
is the real cause of it; for they do not claim that God
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does this in time through a new act of will which he
exercises each time I wish to raise my arm, but by that
single act of the eternal will whereby he has chosen to
do everything that he has foreseen that it will be
necessary to do, in order that the universe micrht be
what he has deemed it ought to be. (LA 84
, Mason
translation)
On Arnauld ' s reading of Malebranche, God forms a plan for
the world, and, by a single volition, creates the world in
its entirety (i.e. all its successive temporal states) in
one fell swoop. It is evident that such a conception
would do away with the objection that occasionalism
requires a constant and undignified tinkering on God's
part. But the main thrust of Leibniz' argument, so it
seems to me, is not against occasionalism's supposed
requirement that the divine agency central to thesis A
involve a constant and active intervention. Indeed, the
discussion in the Clarification quoted above is prefaced
by the supposition (for the sake of argument) that the
occasional ist account of divine activity does not
necessarily entail that it is entirely miraculous.
Rather his main objection is that, if occasionalism were
true, then every instance of apparent mind-body
interaction would involve a miracle on God's part. This
is because, on the occasional i st scheme, it is (for
example) my willing that I raise my arm which provides the
occasion for God's raising my arm. Now, Leibniz will say,
we are all agreed that there is a natural law of bodily
movements according to which the total amount of motive
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force in the universe is maintained. 13 One body can gain
motive force only when another loses a proportional
amount. The occasionalist account introduces a new
movement (that in my arm) without a proportional loss
anywhere else. That is contrary to the laws of nature,
i . e . a mirac 1 e
.
As in the case of continuous particular involvement,
excessive use of miracles is deemed unworthy of God. As a
matter of principle, Malebranche shared Leibniz' view that
there should be very few miracles among God's acts. Each
regarded God's simplicity as one of his most important
attributes, and this includes simplicity of action. In
the Treatise on Nature and Grace
,
Malebranche writes "God
must not do by many complicated ways what he could achieve
by a few simple acts" (OC V 28). Compare this with
Leibniz in the Discourse on Metaphysics (art. V):
"Whatever is said concerning the simplicity of God's ways
has its own place with respect to his means... Reason
demands that one avoid multiplicity in hypotheses or
principles much as the simplest system is preferred in
astronomy" (DM 31-32).
It is clear that Arnauld's response does not address
this problem. However, as we have seen from Chapter IV,
Arnauld recognizes that when Malebranche says that God
acts always by general volition, this means not only that
his conduct of the world involves a very small number of
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volitions (perhaps only one) with a general content, but
also that the effects of his volitions are related to one
another by natural laws, which laws are somehow to be
identified with God's volitions. That is to say, God
wills that events in the ordinary course of nature will
succeed according to natural laws.
My contention, in that chapter, is that Arnauld's
interpretation is accurate, according to which God, by a
few simple and general acts of will establishes the
original state of the universe along with the natural
laws, and by these volitions alone produces the universe
in its entirety. The next question is, does this inter-
pretation render Mai ebranche ' s occasionalism immune to
Leibniz' objection?
In important respects, Mai ebranche ' s theory bears
striking resemblance to that of Leibniz. Malebranche has
his God choose from among an infinity of possible worlds.
The chosen world is instituted by the creation of its
initial state and the laws according to which subsequent
states will come about. Bearing in mind that Malebranche
believes that, in relating mental events with physical
events, God acts "in consequence of the general laws of
union of the two substances which make up man" (D 132,3;
OC XII 136), and bearing in mind Leibniz' apparent
endorsement of mind-body derivative laws, how is it that
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Leibniz believes he is any better off than Malebranche
with respect to miracles.
Leibniz' objection recurs in many subsequent
writings, among the best expositions appearing in the
Considerations on Principles of Life and on Plastic
Natures
.
14 It will be valuable to rehearse the steps as
they are laid out there.
Descartes, having well recognized that there is a law of
nature which holds that the same quantity of force is
conserved (even though he was mistaken in its
application by confusing quantity of force with quantity
of motion), thought it was unnecessary to accord the
soul the power of increasing or diminishing the force of
the body, but only that of changing its direction by
changing the course of the animal spirits. And those
among the Cartesians who have made fashionable the
doctrine of occasional causes, believed that, the soul
being unable to have any influence at all on the body,
it is necessary for God to change the course and
direction of the animal spirits following the wishes of
the soul. (G VI 540; L 587)
The Cartesians recognize a certain law of motion, i.e.
that the total quantity of motive force in the universe is
maintained. If this law is to be universal in its
application, then when a body is moved in consequence of
some volition, the movement of that body must not add to
the total sum of motive force. Now, Descartes and his
followers made the mistake (in Leibniz' view) of thinking
that motive force is the same thing as a measure they
called "quantity of motion”. The quantity of motion of a
given object is determined by multiplying its mass by its
speed. The mass is the quantity of matter, which for the
133
orthodox Cartesian is simply a matter of its extension.
Hence, Descartes thought he could save the law while
maintaining a doctrine of mind-body interaction by saying
that a volition could result in a change in the direction
of a body, but not in its quantity of motion. The
occasional ists
,
eschewing efficacy in the mind, said that
God, on the occasion of a certain volition, would change
the direction of the relevant body but not change its
quantity of motion. 15
"But" said Leibniz "if they had known at the time of
Descartes the new law of nature that I have demonstrated,
which holds that not only the same quantity of total force
of bodies that interact with eachother, but also their
total direction is conserved, he would evidently have come
to my system of pre-established harmony" (G VI 540; L
587). The demonstration referred to is the paper entitled
"A brief demonstration of a notable error...", published
shortly before the letters we have been considering. 16
Leibniz claimed to demonstrate that the measure of motive
force adopted by the Cartesians was wrong, that it should
be not mass times speed but the product of mass and the
square of velocity. Most importantly for this argument,
he took it to follow from this that the "total direction"
is conserved. 17 According to this revised law, the mind
cannot introduce a new direction any more than it can
introduce a new motion. Hence, either the mind does not
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act on the body or the principal law of motion is
"deranged" every time it does.
The important point to note here is that what holds
for Descartes is supposed to hold as well for the
occasional ist . The occasional ist holds, of course that
the mind does not act on the body. But he also holds that
a new motion is introduced into the body by God on the
occasion of a certain volition in the mind. Leibniz
claims that neither new motive force nor new direction can
be introduced into bodies, from any source, without
thereby deranging the laws of nature. "In the system of
occasional causes, God... is obliged to change at every
moment the natural train of thoughts of the soul in order
to accomodate them to the impressions of bodies, and to
disturb the natural course of the movements of bodies
according to the volitions of the soul, something which
can only be explained by a perpetual miracle" (G VI 541; L
587) .
On the Cartesian scheme, there is a tension between
the laws governing the movements of bodies and the
generalizations that Malebranche calls the laws of union
of body and mind. Leibniz denies that the latter could be
genuine even derivative natural laws if Cartesian physics
were true, since they would conflict with the primary laws
of nature. Thus, for example, he sees the movement of my
arm produced on the occasion of my willing to move my arm
135
as being miraculous, unless that movement is also in
accordance with the ordinary laws of physics, given the
prior state of my arm. Looking at the Leibnizian versions
of thesis C, we can say this: an instance of derivative
occasional causation having for its effect my arm's being
raised at a given time, can occur only if there occurs
also an instance of primary occasional causation having
the same effect at the same time. Since Cartesian physics
precludes the latter in the event of mind-body occasional
interactions, such interactions must always be accompanied
by miraculous interventions.
It seems at this stage that there are three ways in
which Malebranche might respond. First, he could admit
that all such movements are miraculous. I don't believe
any major proponent of occasionalism would have embraced
this position willingly.
Second, he could reject the privileged status of
Leibnizian primary laws, substituting instead a heirarchy
of his three kinds of natural law, in which those
governing the relationship of mind and body may sometimes
override the laws relating states of particular
substances . 18 Whether or not Malebranche would have been
happy with this conception of matters is something I won't
go into here, because I think that the occasional ist has a
more telling response to make.
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Leibniz wants to rest his argument for an important
conceptual difference between his own theory of causation
and occasionalism on a factual claim about the laws of
nature. An occasional ist can clearly accept the claim
about the laws of nature. Must he therefore abandon the
conceptual framework of occasionalism. The answer is no.
He could argue as follows: God, seeing that the laws of
motion that he has chosen may come into conflict with the
laws of union of mind and body that he has chosen, will
decide to institute the first state of the world in such a
way that no occasion for such a conflict arises. He
brings it about that whenever my mind wills to raise my
arm my body will be in a suitable state to occasion the
raising of my arm in accordance with the laws of motion
(so long as no other impediment obstructs in accordance
with the same laws). According to this account, the
psycho-physical laws would be redundant. This might come
as a surprise or even a disappointment to an orthodox
Cartesian, but would not be grounds for abandoning the
metaphysics of the theory of causation. In fact, the view
limned above seems indistinguishable from that of Leibniz,
and yet it departs from standard accounts of occasionalism
only in factual detail regarding what genuine laws there
are. Perhaps most importantly, Leibniz has not brought
grounds for rejecting any of the three theses. In the
addition to article xvii of the Treatise , Malebranche
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claims "that. it. would need a whole separate book to show
which laws of nature really hold. "But that" he says "is
not essential to my subject. It is sufficient that the
laws of nature should be general" (OC V 31). What laws of
nature there are is not an essential part of the theory;
only that there are general laws of nature that God
follows in his conduct of the world.
Bjl The Second Formulation of the ' Continual Miracle '
Argument
In his letter of April 30th 1687, Leibniz develops a
new line of argument. Quoting from Arnauld's March 4th
letter, he asserts "if I properly understand the opinion
of the authors of occasional causes, they introduce a
miracle which is no less so for being continual, for it
seems to me that the concept of a miracle does not consist
in infrequency" (LA 92; RL 64).
The occasional i st position has been defended by
Arnauld from the charge of introducing continual miracles
into God's actions by the observation that God acts
invariably according to a general plan and in keeping with
certain regularities that occasional ists claim are laws of
nature. Leibniz claims that God "could make for himself
general rules even with respect to miracles" (LA 93; RL
65). The fact that the actions of God exhibit regularity,
frequency and generality is insufficient to prevent their
being miraculous. There is some feature other than
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regularity intrinsic to natural events
them from the miraculous. This is how
that feature in the correspondence:
that distinguishes
Leibniz explains
A miracle differs intrinsically and in the substance of
the act from an ordinary action, and not by an external
accident of frequent repetition. Strictly speaking, God
performs a miracle when he does anything which surpasses
the powers which he has given to creatures and which he
conserves in them... We would have to say, in
accordance with the current conception, that if the
continuation of motion surpasses the power of bodies,
the continuation of motion is a true miracle; instead of
which I believe that corporeal substance has the power
to continue its changes following with the laws which
God has put into its nature and conserves there. (LA 93;
RL 65)
Leibniz is not being entirely forthcoming here. A full
understanding of what is meant by "the laws which God has
put into its nature and conserves there" would require,
for Arnauld, at least having read several full articles of
the Discourse on Metaphysics . Arnauld had only read an
1 9
abstract of that work. In the Discourse article xvi
,
Leibniz outlined two distinct concepts of the nature of a
substance 20 He says
:
If we comprehend in our nature everything that it
expresses, nothing is supernatural to it, because it
extends to everything... But as that which our nature
expresses most perfectly pertains in a particular way to
it, since it is in this that its power consists... there
are indeed things that surpass the powers of our nature,
and even those of all limited natures. (DM 53)
In the first sense, the nature of a substance is co-
extensive with its complete individual concept, the
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complete set of intrinsic properties had by that
substance. Leibniz says that each substance "expresses",
with varying degrees of distinctness, everything that
happens to it throughout its career. One state of a
substance follows from its antecedent state in accordance
with what Leibniz calls "the universal law of general
order" (DM 52; cf. DM 32-33). This is the general rule
that God follows in his conduct of the world. However,
consequent on this "universal law" are certain
"subordinate maxims", the laws of nature. The mark of a
law of nature is that it can be understood by a finite
mind, and what can be understood by a finite mind is what
it expresses most clearly. In the second sense, the
nature of a substance consists only in those states most
distinctly expressed by it.
For Leibniz, the primary laws of nature are those
that relate the successive states of one individual
substance. So one state of a substance follows from its
antecedent state, in the ordinary course of nature, if it
follows in accordance with the subordinate maxim or law
that governs the natural actions' of that substance. A
miracle is any event that occurs which is not governed by
any of these laws.
Now, I don't think that, as yet, there is anything
here that is damaging to occasionalism. An occasional ist
could accept the whole business of universal and
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subordinate laws, and of greater and lesser degrees of
expression without denying that God is ultimately the only
cause of any state of any created substance. Leibniz'
assertion that "that which our nature expresses most
perfectly pertains to it in a particular way, since it is
in this that its power consists" has an echo in this maxim
from New Essays on Human Understanding : "the power of
conceiving is the measure of nature's powers." 21 An
occasional ist may say "if this is what is meant by
'natural powers' then we don't deny that creatures have
such powers. But these are not real causal powers."
However, Leibniz clearly holds that underlying the
'distinct expression' account of nature is some notion of
real power intrinsic in created substances. The
difference between natural and supernatural events is not
just phenomenal. Leibniz' main argument for real active
powers in created entities is that without them there
could be no substantial unity - no individual substances.
This is how he argues for this conclusion in the draft for
the letter to Arnauld of November 28/December 8 1686:
It will be conceded that two bodies set apart from one
another, for example two triangles, are not really one
substance. Let us now assume that they are brought
together to make up a square. Will the mere fact of
their contiguity turn them into one substance? I do not
think so. Now, each extended mass can be conceived as
consisting of two or a thousand others; there exists
only an extension achieved through contiguity. Thus one
will never be able to find a body of which it may truly
be said that it is truly one substance. (LA 72)
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If all there were in bodies was extension, there would be
individual corporeal substances. So, it follows, we
must attribute an additional component, an "active
principle or substantial form, to explain the substantial
unity of any given corporeal substance.
I hope it goes without saying that what we have here
is an outright rejection of Mai ebranche ' s second thesis.
It is central to the occasional ist position that a created
individual can have no power to change the states either
of itself or of any other thing. If the Leibnizian
conditions for miracles are correct, then of course
occasionalism implies that everything that happens is
miracul ous
.
Needless to say, Malebranche could (and will) deny
this definition of the miraculous. But that is not the
point. In championing intrinsic powers in natural beings,
Leibniz is self-consciously distancing himself from some
of the consequences of occasional ist metaphysics. What
those consequences are will emerge in the final part of my
paper. In the meantime I want to see how this departure
affects Leibniz' position with regard to the three theses
of occasionalism.
It turns out that Leibniz accepts Thesis B with only
one (seemingly innocuous) rider: Thesis B is true where c'
is not identical with c. So individual substances are not
excluded from being causal agents in bringing about their
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own states. For example, when Arnauld asks what causes
the pain on the occasion of his being pricked, Leibniz
answers "that the soul forms for itself this pain, which
is a natural consequence of its state or concept" (LA 74;
RL 53).
This makes some difference to Thesis C. Consider the
distinction I made between primary occasional causation
and derivative occasional causation. This distinction is
based on a distinction between primary natural laws and
derivative natural laws. Since primary natural laws -
laws that relate states of one individual substance - can
now be seen to be genuine causal laws, we can see that
primary occasional causation is real causation. Leibniz,
like Malebranche, needs to explain the appearance of
causal relationships among created substances. That is
the purpose that Thesis C serves. The appearance-saving
component in Leibniz' theory need only make reference to
what I have called derivative occasional causation.
The change in Thesis B has a rather more profound
effect on the implications of Thesis A. The conjunction
of Thesis A, Mai ebranche ' s Thesis B and the principle that
only substances can be real causal agents implies that God
is the only real causal agent. God's causal agency in
each state of each substance is total. The conjunction of
the Leibnizian version of Thesis B with Thesis A and the
proposition that created substances are real causes of
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their own states in practically all instances has the
consequence that there
causal agency between
wants to say that for
actions of individual
consider whether that
are cases (a great number) of dual
God and created substances. Leibni
the most part, God concurs in the
substances. In Chapter VI we must
is a tenable position for Leibniz.
z
C . The ' Subs i stent Effect 1 Objection
In his 1694 paper "On Nature Itself", Leibniz
introduces a new and somewhat surprising objection to
occasionalism. I want to consider this objection here
because I think it throws light on the precise point at
which Malebranche and Leibniz are unable to agree.
Writing on the occasionalism of the physicist Johann
Christophe Sturm, he says:
He admits that motions now taking place result by virtue
of an eternal law once established by God, which he then
calls a volition or command, and that no new command or
new volition of God is then necessary... But this
explanation does not seem to me to do justice to the
truth. For I ask whether this volition or command has
bestowed upon things only an extrinsic denomination or
whether it has truly conferred upon them some created
impression which endures within them or... an internal
law from which their actions and passions follow.. The
former view seems to be that of the authors of the
system of occasional causes and especially of the
ingenious M. Malebranche; the latter is the accepted
view, and I believe the truest. For since this command
in the past no longer exists at present, it can
accomplish nothing unless it has left some subsistent
effect behind it. (G IV 506; L, p500. Translation by
Loemker
)
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Whatever Leibniz may mean by "...has bestowed upon
things only an extrinsic denomination...", i think the
message is clear. A cause cannot act remote in space and
time from its effect. God's volitons at the time of
creation cannot be acting on us now except through some
medium, the medium of the natures of substances.
Mai ebranche would surely have shuddered at reading this.
What Leibniz is saying here is tantamount to the denial
that God's actions take place outside of time. For
Malebranche, it is fundamental that they do. This is from
Dialogue VI I
:
From all eternity God has willed, and to all eternity he
will continue to will - or to speak more accurately, God
wills unceasingly though without variation, without
succession, without necessity - everything he will do in
the course of time (D 156,7; OC XII 159).
As soon Leibniz says "since this command no longer exists
at present", he has parted company with Malebranche. It
seems that Mai ebranche ' s conception of the contents of
God's volitions is something like this. There are
particular volitions, with particular times associated
with them. God wills, for example, that at the first
instant of creation Adam should be a full-grown man, or
that at time t the water turns into wine. Note that this
is different from saying "God wills at t that the water
turns into wine". On the other hand there are general
volitions which have no associated time. The contents of
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these are the general laws. No volition of God's itself
happens at a time. They are all eternal, and the content
of God’s will is unchanging. The effects of the
particular volitions will occur at the relevant times but
that is not to say that that is when the volitions occur.
The effects of the general volitions will be spread out
over time. Of course, no volition of the form "if c is in
state s and is in relation R to c' then c' is in s'" will
have any particular consequence. Surely, when Malebranche
talks of the effects of God’s general volitions, this is
elliptical for the effects of the combination of God's
general volitions and those particular volitions
concerning the initial state of creation
.
23
It seems reasonably clear to me that this objection
of Leibniz' rests on the most fundamental difference of
conception between himself and Malebranche. For
Malebranche, the central component of the concept of cause
seems to be that of necessity. Malebranche saw that God's
volitions must have their effect necessarily, and hence it
was sufficient that a state of affairs be entailed by the
content of God's volitions for that state of affairs to
come about. For Leibniz, it seems that there is a
residual question, which is, roughly, by what means or by
what force does this volition have its effect. For
Leibniz, the concept of a force or a power is still at the
heart of the concept of a cause. In order for God's
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volition that a certain law be observed by creatures to be
enacted, it is necessary either that God individually
compels them to observe the law, or that he endows each
creature with the power or force to observe the law by
itself. In the concluding chapter, I will have more to
say about this divergence.
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CHAPTER VI
OCCASIONALISM, NATURE AND CONCURRENCE
The success of the 'continual miracle' objection to
occasionalism depends on Leibniz' ability to sustain his
view that created entities exercise real power in bringing
about their own states. Without that, his 'distinct
expression' concept of natural powers can be reduced to a
sophisticated form of occasionalism. We have seen
Leibniz' main argument for the view that there are
substantial forms in created substances
,
1 but I believe
that this argument alone will not show that these
2
substantial forms are real causal powers. In this final
chapter, I shall consider two of the most important
reasons Leibniz had for holding that they are. Naturally,
he felt that this importance lay in significant advantages
that his own theory had.
I think it's fair to say that Leibniz saw the
advantages of his scheme as falling into two categories:
advantages for physics and advantages for theology. We
will take them in order. In section A, I shall examine
Leibniz' argument that someone who is a Cartesian about
the nature of matter is theoretically committed to the
wrong laws of physics. In section B, I shall turn to
Leibniz' efforts to establish a satisfactory account of
concurrence, one that leaves room for freedom. I shall
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conclude by suggesting how occasionalism may be defended
in the face of the alleged advantages.
A. The Laws of Nature
Mai ebranche is committed to the Cartesian metaphysic
of substance. Substances come in two kinds, material and
mental, bodies and spirits. Concentrating on the body,
the Cartesian view is that its essence is nothing but
extension and its modes are nothing but modes of
extension. Leibniz believes that if this account of
substance were true, then natural phenomena would not be
what they are. In article xxi of the Discours e on
Metaphysics
,
he writes:
If there were nothing in bodies but extended mass, and
motion were only a change of place, and if everything
ought to be and could be deduced by geometric necessity
from these definitions alone, it would follow... that
the smallest body would give to a larger one at rest
which it met, the same velocity, without losing any of
the velocity it had itself (DM 64).
Leibniz seems to hold that anyone who is a Cartesian
about the properties of matter is theoretically committed
to the wrong laws of nature. Recall the argument
recounted in the previous chapter, 4 in which Leibniz
employs his discovery that the measure of force conserved
in nature is mv2 . He concluded from this that, since the
conservation of this quantity includes conservation of
total motion in a given direction, nothing is able to
introduce either a wholly new and uncompensated motion or
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a new direction into the natural world except by deranging
the laws of nature, i.e. by a miracle. Occasionalism was
defended against this argument by pointing out that God
could have created the world in such a way that no motion
of a body or action of a will is ever, as a matter of
fact, the occasion for such a derangement. God could
create and sustain the world according to the laws that
Leibniz claims are the true ones.
Effectively, what Leibniz does at DM xxi is to deny
to someone who holds the Cartesian view of matter the
option of this latter move - the "occasional izing" of the
conservation law. In order to understand his argument, it
will be necessary to draw a couple of distinctions. First
of all, I distinguish here and elsewhere between a measure
and the quantity it measures. For example I distinguish
between the quantity of motion in a body, which Descartes
seems to regard as a mode of that body, and the measure of
that quantity which is calculated by multiplying the
measure of the speed of the body and the measure of its
size. Speed times size is not quantity of motion but is
the measure of it.
This is important because there are some measures
which do not apparently measure any real quantity at all.
I believe that Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz would
all of them have agreed that there is a reasonable
distinction between the natural properties that a thing
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has in its own right and certain artificial ones that we
may attribute to it. The length, volume, motion, etc. of
a body are all natural modes of that body, properties that
really inhere in it (although motion is odd, for
Descartes, since he thinks that it is purely relational.) 5
Each of these real quantities has its own measure. On the
other hand, we may come up with a certain measure of a
body by multiplying the square of its length by its volume
by the cube of its speed and dividing the whole lot by an
arbitrary constant. This would be some sort of measure of
the body, but on the view of none of the above would it
measure any real quantity. It might measure something.
It might, perhaps, be used to determine the cash value of
each object, but this is only an artificial quantity.
There is no real mode naturally occurring in any object
which this measure represents.
Obviously there is a degree of vagueness in the
notions of real and artificial quantities. The
geometrical quantities like length, breadth and depth are
uncontrovers ial ly among the natural ones.
6 The latter
example seems uncontrovers ia 1 1 y artificial. The
interesting cases with respect to measures and the
quantities they measure concern the measurement of force.
Descartes seems to have thought, and Leibniz did not
challenge this, that what is measured by speed times size,
what he called quantity of motion, is a real quantity - a
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natural mode of bodies. But Leibniz discovered that this
quantity is not conserved.
On Leibniz' view, there is nothing in the geometrical
properties of matter which entails that his measure of
motive force, the product of mass and the square velocity
(mv ), will be conserved. And yet, says Leibniz, it is.
2 *7So, mv cannot measure a real geometrical quantity. Yet
God’s choice of the law that conserves this measure cannot
be arbitrary. It follows that mv must measure some real
though non-geometrical quantity that is conserved, i.e.
motive force. "Force" he concludes "is something
different from size, shape or motion, and one may judge
from this that everything conceived in body does not
consist solely in extension and its modifications, as our
moderns persuade themselves" (DM 58). There must be
intrinsic principles of action in bodies, which explain
why mv is conserved and not the quantity proposed by the
Cartesians
.
My suspicion is that this attempt to show that there
is an essential conceptual link between Cartesian
metaphysics and the abandoned conservation law must be
unsuccesful . Leibniz is appealing here to the Principle
of Sufficient Reason: there must be a satisfactory
explanation for why this measure is conserved.
Ma 1 ebranche would hardly deny that, but he may deny that
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the reason must be that some real quantity is being
conserved
.
Leibniz' reasoning here is elliptical in the extreme.
In attempting to understand it, I think it is worth
rehearsing Descartes' reasons for holding the conservation
law he does. In The World he tells us "with God always
acting in the same way and producing substantially the
same effect, there are, as if by accident, many
differences in this effect” (AT XI 37; CSM I 93). Since
God is immutable, it is true that God always acts in the
same way. In the World
,
this fact is sufficient for the
establishment of the particular laws of nature. In the
Principles
,
there is an additional step. God's
immutablity gives us grounds for holding a very general
law of motion, the law that the total amount of motion and
rest is conserved. This law stands as a kind of
conditioning principle for the other laws of nature.
Here, again, God's immutability is the key:
God's perfection involves not only his being immutable
in himself, but also his operating in a manner that is
always utterly constant and immutable. . . . God imparted
various motions to the parts of matter when he first
created them, and now he preserves all this matter in
the same way, and by the same process by which he
originally created it; and it follows from what we have
said that this fact alone makes it most reasonable to
think that God likewise always preserves the same
quantity of motion in matter. (AT VIIIA 61-2; CSM I
240)
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The total quantity of motion (measured as size times
speed) is maintained in the universe, and this is the
fundamental law of physics, because God put a certain
amount of motion into the world at the creation and it
would be inconstant of him to change that.
My assumption is that Leibniz' reasoning is similar.
He, too, is c omm itted to God's i mmutab ility. But since
the measure of what is conserved in the universe does not
measure quantity of motion we must seek some other
quantity, one which is measured by mv2
,
that God does
conserve. Leibniz recognizes that nothing in the
geometrical properties of matter remains constant, so
there must be something else among the properties of
matter that God conserves, something which explains why
the phenomena are the way they are. The alternative is
that God's conservative action is inconstant, in order
O
that a seemingly arbitrary measure may remain constant.
For Malebranche, all of the above concern about what
real quantities God conserves is entirely unnecessary. As
we saw in Chapter IV, Malebranche does not conceive of
God's immutability as a kind of succession of
qualitatively identical states. There is one timeless
state of God, including the volition or volitions he has
which are sufficient for every temporal state of the
world. When Descartes says that creation and conservation
are the same action for God, he seems to have in mind the
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same kind of action. God has a succession of volitions in
creating and conserving the world, each of which has the
same content. This is evident when we consider his
argument for the conservation law. If the quantity of
motion were to change, that would mean God had changed his
mind; the volition required for the most recent state of
the world would have had a different content.
If, on the other hand, we adopt Mai ebranche ’
s
picture, according to which one complex and eternal
volition is sufficient for the world in its temporal
entirety, there would be no problem with no quantity being
conserved at all. God could have willed and sustained a
world with no conservation law without threat to his
immutability. What motivates the laws of nature on
Mai ebranche 1 s view is not God's immutability, but rather
the perfection of simplicity or elegance of means.
Leibniz and Malebranche are more or less agreed about
the constraints on God's choice of natural laws. On the
one hand the laws must be simple, but on the other they
9
must be, to use Malebranche ' s term, "fecond" or fertile.
There is no reason why this latter constraint should not
provide the sufficient reason for a law which, considered
in itself, may seem arbitrary. God could, indeed does,
conduct the world according to this law, and he presumably
has good reason to do so, based on considerations of
balance between simplicity and fertility.
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This is an admittedly hasty consideration of the
consequences for physics of Leibniz' view. I think there
is considerable work to be done on the exact relationship
that Leibniz saw between metaphysics and physics
.
10 What
I want to contend here is that, at least on the face of
it, Malebranche can appeal to the conflicting constraints
on God's choices in order to explain any prima facie
arbitrariness in the laws of nature, and can thereby avoid
the requirement of positing natural causal powers of any
kind
.
B . Divine Concurrence
So much, then, for physics. What about the supposed
advantages for theology? The most obvious advantage that
Leibniz saw for his scheme over the occasional ist position
was that concomitance leaves room for human freedom while
occasionalism must surely be incompatible with it.
Related to this is a theodicean advantage. Leibniz
believes his position provides the only hope for a
solution to the problem of evil. A full account of these
advantages would have to explain exactly what God's
concurrence in creaturely action amounts to for Leibniz.
There would be some merit in a close examination of
Leibiz' conception of concurrence, but I will not do that
here
,
11 in large part because I think Malebranche has an
excellent argument for the conclusion that any kind of
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concurrence is impossible. I will conclude by crivincr a
brief account of that argument.
In Chapter I
, concurrence was introduced as a
technical term in the following way: God concurs in state
of affairs s if and only if God efficaciously wills that s
obtain and there is some other agent a such that a is a
real causal agent in s's obtaining. We might want to call
this technical notion strong’ concurrence since the
ordinary understanding of concurrence allows for a variety
of ways in which God might team up with created agents to
produce effects. The concept of pre-conditioning might
reasonably be regarded as a weak concept of concurrence.
God may even contribute to states of affairs without
knowing what other agents will contribute. Needless to
say, this last concept of concurrence would not be in
accord with the doctrine of Divine Providence.
Leibniz adhered to the doctrine of Providence. God
is a real causal agent in every state of every substance
and knows all the outcomes of his contributions. There is
reason to think that his notion of concurrence is not the
strong one. For one thing, he holds that there are
certain states of affairs that it would be inappropriate
to say God caused directly, instances of creaturely sin,
for example. 13 Ma 1 ebranche , however, as was shown in
Chapter III, felt that both the weaker notion, according
to which God's contribution to some states of affairs is
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mere pre conditioning and the stronger notion are
incoherent
.
It became evident earlier on that the ways Leibniz
and Mai ebranche each view the antecedents of creation are
very similar. In each case, God is supposed to survey
(figuratively speaking) the infinity of possible worlds
open to him and choose that which is most worthy of
creation. Leibniz describes this choice as the object of
God's general will. 14 This is terminology that has a
parallel in Malebranche. According to the latter, God's
ordinary conduct of the world is enacted through his
general volition, the simple and general acts of will by
which the world was created and the laws instituted. In
Mai ebranche ' s view, the initial acts of choosing that
brought it about that this be the world were both
necessary and sufficient for every subsequent state. This
is because, as he he says in the Treatise
,
"God has no
need of instruments in order to act; his volitions are
necessarily efficacious" (art. xii, OC V 27). The result
is that there is no room for anything else to act,
nothing for anything to co-operate in.
Now the idea that God's volitions are necessarily
efficacious is not unique to Malebranche. This is from
the Discourse on Metaphysics (article V): "It is true that
nothing has any cost to God, any more than to a
philosopher in forming hypotheses in order to create his
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imaginary world. Because God needs only to make decrees
to bring into being a real world" (DM 32). It would seem
that if God forms the general volition to create this
world, then he thereby and directly brings about
everything that happens in this world. That surely
precludes the possibility of any state of affairs being
merely pre-conditioned.
In Chapter III, we saw Mai ebranche ' s argument to the
effect that strong concurrence is impossible. 15 It is
roughly that, since God's efficacious will is a necessary
condition for bringing about any state of affairs, no
state of any other substance can be a sufficient condition
for any state of affairs, which is what was required in
order for a substance to be a genuine cause. As suggested
in section B of Chapter IV, there may be a problem with
this argument. But Malebranche is entitled to fall back
on this question: what explanatory role can the positing
of natural causes perform? In God, we already have a
cause of every state of affairs requiring a cause.
Positing any further real cause, apart from being
redundant, implies that God is in need of instruments to
bring about his ends.
C . Concluding Remarks
Where does all this leave us at the end of the day
with respect to Leibniz' claimed theological advantages.
Malebranche is entitled to the view that Leibniz gets the
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advantages only at the cost of two disadvantages. First,
that God is in need of intermediate means to bring about
his ends, and second, that God does not act from the point
of view of eternity but from within the limits of time.
These two propositions are the principle excesses of the
deist heresy that both philosophers wanted to avoid at all
costs. Whether Leibniz can avoid that heresy is not
something I want to go into here. I do not wish to
suggest that he cannot. However, I believe that without a
satisfactory answer to such an argument as has been
presented here, the advantages of the theory of
concomitance cannot be sustained. Such an answer must, I
believe, elucidate Leibniz' conception of the distinction
between God's general and particular will (see, e.g.
Discourse on Metaphysics V, DM 34)
.
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Notes1.
See pages 135ff..
2.
However, it may be argued that if an entity is to serve
as a principle of unity, as Leibniz' substantial forms
do, it can only so serve by actively uniting that of
which it is the principle of unity, i.e. it must, by
definition, exercise a real causal power.
3. The locus classicus of this position is Descartes'
Fifth Meditation (AT VII 63-5; CSM II 44-5); see also
Principles Part I, articles 53 and 54 (AT VIIIA 25; CSM
I 210-1).
4. See pages 127ff.
5. Similarly, for Leibniz this claim must be treated with
caution. Leibniz says in the Discourse on Metaphysics
that "the notions contained in extension contain
something imaginary" (DM xii) and hence are not to be
regarded as real natural properties. Rather there is
something in a corporeal substance that grounds its
being perceived as extended. Nonetheless, Leibniz
seems to have been comfortable with talking of
extension as an attribute of corporeal substances, and
besides, he certainly knows the distinction between the
primitive intrinsic properties that a thing has and
what he calls its extrinsic denominations. With respect
to the latter, there are none that are irreducibly
extrinsic, i.e. that cannot be denoted without
reference to other substances.
6. There may be controversy about which properties are to
be regarded as the geometrical ones. Leibniz seems
prepared to accept the quantity of motion of a body as
a geometrical property, but finds nothing among the
geometrical properties that corresponds to his measure
of motive force, mass times the square of velocity.
Nonetheless, mass can be regarded as equivalent to the
Cartesian size, which is a geometrical property, and
velocity is speed in a given direction. So the measure
of motive force is a compound of measures of
geometrical quantities, yet, on Leibniz' view it does
not itself measure a geometrical quantity.
7 . See note 6 above
.
8. What God conserves, on Leibniz' view is substances and
their intrinsic properties. If there is no intrinsic
property of a substance that is represented by the
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2measure mv then there is no real quantity that God
keeps constantly the same.9.
Treatise article xvii (OC V 31).
10. For my ideas on this matter I am indebted to the
comments of John Carriero.
11. For a useful introduction to Leibniz' views on
concurrence, see R. C. Sleigh Jr. "Leibniz on
Malebranche on Causality" in J. A. Cover and Mark
Kulstad, eds . Centra 1 Themes in Early Modern Phi 1 osophy
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991).
12 . See
,
for example, Grua 312.
13 . See
,
for example, Grua 308.
14 . See Discourse on Metaphysics article v (DM 34)
15 . See pages 85ff.
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